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I. INTRODUCTION
On the afternoon of September 7, 1986, in a field west of Boca
Raton, Florida, a farm worker stumbled upon a ghastly sight.' In
the midst of a makeshift junkyard, strung between two poles, he
found a naked body.2 The hands tied to one pole, the feet to an-
other, the body was bruised so badly that the farmworker was una-
ble to determine the victim's race." Two young men, William Whit-
more and Horace "Ace" Williams, were arrested and charged with
the killing. Shortly before trial, Whitmore pleaded guilty to second
1. Van Meter, Suspect in Grisly Murder Did "Whatever Ace Did," Witness Says,
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degree murder;4 however, Williams, a twenty-three year old com-
petitive bodybuilder, rejected a similar plea offer and proceeded to
trial-ultimately advancing a novel argument for his exculpation.'
At trial, Williams's attorney argued that his client was insane
on the night he allegedly killed Michael Shane Patterson.6 Wil-
liams's insanity, his attorney claimed, resulted from Williams's ex-
cessive use of anabolic steroids." Experts for the defense testified
that Williams's excessive use of anabolic steroids made him prone
to psychotic episodes similar to that which allegedly disabled his
mind on the night of the killing.6 Moreover, the defense argued
4. Van Meter, Whitmore Pleads Guilty to Killing Hitchhiker, Palm Beach Post, May
12, 1988, at 4B, col.1. Whitmore was sentenced to forty years in prison. Id.
5. Van Meter & Hatcher, Body Builder Guilty of Killing, Robbing Drifter, Palm
Beach Post, June 8, 1988, at 1B, 4B, col.2.
6. Defense in Slaying Case Cites Steroid Addiction, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1988, at 20,
col.5.
7. See Notice of Intent To Rely On Insanity As Defense, State v. Horace Williams,
No. 86-9275 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed May 2, 1988) ("The nature of the insanity that the
defendant expects to prove will be that at the time of the offense the defendant had a
mental infirmity, defect, or disease resulting from the use of anabolic steroids .... ").
At the time of the killing Horace Williams was a magnificently built bodybuilder who
for the previous 18 months had been on an excessive regimen of both injectable and orally
activated anabolic steroids, often stacking the drugs so as to optimize the effects. See Depo-
sition of William M. Taylor, M.D., at 7-8, 24, 80, State v. Horace Williams, No. 86-9275 CF
(Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. taken May 14, 1988). See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for an
explanation of stacking. The doses Williams ingested reportedly were often 2,000 times the
normal clinical dose. O'Meila, Physician: Accused Killer "Powder Keg," Palm Beach Post,
June 2, 1988, at 4B, col. 1.
8. Id. On the night of the killing, Williams was out for the evening with his best
friend, William Whitmore, and another man, Edward Danielson. Defense In Slaying Case
Cites Steroid Addiction, supra note 6, at 20, col. 5. After attending a party the threesome
became bored and began looking for something to do. Van Meter, Steroid Use To Be Used
As Murder Trial Defense, Palm Beach Post, May 5, 1988, at 5B, col. 1. As they cruised in
Whitmore's car, Williams became increasingly violent. The violence reached its pre-killing
pinnacle when, as the trio stopped at a local convenience store, Williams angrily ripped a
pay-phone from its metal stand upon discovering it to be out of order. Burneko, Murder
Defense: Steroids Made Suspect a "Volcano," Palm Beach Post, May 28, 1988, at 4B.
Soon after they returned to the road, the trio stopped to pick up a hitchhiker, Michael
Shane Patterson. When Patterson entered the car, Williams suddenly said he needed his
wallet from a nearby storage area. Complying, Whitmore drove the foursome to a deserted
area west of Boca Raton, Florida. After Williams and Patterson exited the car, Williams
asked the large, dark haired Patterson for his cash. Replying that he had none, Williams
ordered him to strip. Id. At that point the violence began.
Danielson claimed Williams began 'flipping out" and that Williams beat Patterson with
a pipe. Van Meter, supra note 1, at 3B. Patterson tried to run, but Williams stopped him.
Trying to defend himself, the drifter picked up a board and tried to hit his attacker.
Burneko, supra at 4B. Williams took the 2 x 8 from Patterson and began using it "like an
ax" on Patterson's head. Van Meter, supra note 1, at 3B. Allegedly "growling like a bear,"
Williams shredded Patterson's pants, ripping the belt loops off. Van Meter, Steroids Domi-
nate Closing Arguments, Palm Beach Post, June 4, 1988, at 3B, col. 3. Kicking Patterson,
Williams tore like a rabid animal through Patterson's backpack, scattering the contents
1989]
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that Williams's mental health had deteriorated without his
knowledge.'
Although a criminal defendant had used the defense of ster-
oid-induced insanity to eliminate criminal responsibility on at least
one prior occasion,10 the defense was untested in Florida. Wil-
liams's claim would mark the first, albeit unsuccessful, Florida
claim. Ultimately, a Palm Beach County, Florida, jury rejected
Williams's defense and found him guilty of first degree murder and
robbery." The court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment for
around the scene. Van Meter, supra note 1, at 3B. Pleading for his life, Patterson was
strung between two poles, his hands tied to one and his feet to another. Defense In Slaying
Case Cites Steroid Addiction, supra note 6, at 20, col. 5. The assailants then left Patterson
to die. Hatcher & Van Meter, Body-builder Gets 55 Years In Murder, Palm Beach Post,
June 11, 1988, at 2B, col. 4. The farm worker discovered Patterson's body the next day. Van
Meter, Steroid Use To Be Used As Murder Trial Defense, supra, at 5B, col. 1.
9. Burneko, supra note 8, at 1B, col. 2.
10. See State v. Michael David Williams, No. C-5630/5631/5634 (Circuit Court for St.
Mary's County, Md. filed April 3, 1986). Williams was charged with three counts of arson in
June of 1985. Williams had been described as an "exemplary" naval seaman with no past
criminal record; however, for the 18 months prior to committing the crime, Williams had
been on a regimen of excessive steroid use to enhance his ability to compete as a
bodybuilder. Opinion and Order, State v. Michael David Williams, supra (entered March
27, 1986). Williams pleaded insanity as a result of his steroid use. See Pleas, State v.
Michael David Williams, supra (entered October 4, 1985). After a bench trial, the court
found Williams guilty but not criminally responsible on all three counts. The court reasoned
that Williams "was indeed suffering from an organic personality syndrome caused by the
toxic levels of anabolic steroids ... and that this disorder substantially impaired his ability
to appreciate the criminality of his acts and to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law." See Opinion and Order, State v. Michael David Williams, supra. The court or-
dered Williams discharged from the jurisdiction of the state twenty-two days later. Order
Pursuant To MD. HEALTH-GEm CODE ANN. sec. 12-117, State v. Michael David Williams,
supra (entered April 18, 1986). It is important to note that Williams was found not crimi-
nally responsible under a test which is modeled after the American Law Institute's "sub-
stantial capacity" test-the most liberal of the various definitions of insanity. Cf. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985); infra notes 114-148 and accompanying text (discussing an ana-
bolic steroid-induced psychosis in the context of the M'Naghten test-universally consid-
ered the most stringent of the tests of legal insanity).
See also Commonwealth v. Boblett, No. 88000258-F (Circuit Court for the County of
Botetourt, Va. sentenced Sept. 22, 1988) (defendant convicted, inter alia, of attempted mur-
der after pleading insanity resulting from the excessive use of anabolic steroids); State v.
Woolstrum, No. 85-672 (Circuit Court for Clackamas County, Oregon) (steroid user con-
victed of violent attack on woman). Boblett's conviction is currently on appeal to the Court
of Appeals of Virginia (#1339-88-3). For an outstanding discussion of the circumstances
leading to the conviction of Woolstrum, Horace Williams, and Boblett, including the results
of structured psychiatric interviews of each man, see Pope & Katz, Homicide and Near-
homicide by Anabolic Steroid Users, 51 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 28 (1990).
11. Van Meter & Hatcher, supra note 5, at 1B, col. 2. Williams was convicted of first
degree murder pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1987) and robbery with a weapon pursuant
to FLA. STAT. § 812.13(2)(a)-(b) (1987). Judgment, State v. Horace Williams, No. 86-9257 CF
(Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed June 7, 1988).
Among others, the defense requested the court give the following instruction to the
[Vol. 7:1
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the murder and an additional thirty years for the robbery."2
Physiological and psychological side effects have long been as-
sociated with the use of anabolic steroids. 13 However, recent re-
search has begun to reveal that there may be psychiatric repercus-
sions of steroid use far beyond the mere increase in aggressiveness
commonly reported in the past." Currently, researchers believe
that anabolic steroids, when used in large doses,15 may lead to a
severe toxic psychosis. 16 Attorneys representing steroid users
charged with crimes have begun to use the psychological state al-
legedly created by the drugs as a shield against criminal
responsibility.
This Article examines whether a steroid-induced psychosis
presents a viable tool to eliminate, or alternatively, mitigate crimi-
nal responsibility. Section II provides a brief overview of the use
jury: "The defense maintains that as a result of the long-term use of anabolic steroids,
HORACE WILLIAMS was insane on the night that Michael Shane Patterson was killed.
You are instructed that under certain circumstances drugs can cause insanity as I have pre-
viously defined that word to you." Defendant's Requested Jury Instruction No. 5, State v.
Horace Williams, No. 86-9257 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed June 2, 1988). The trial judge
rejected this instruction. In his actual instruction to the jury on insanity the trial judge did
not mention anabolic steroids or the potential role of drugs in a determination of insanity.
Transcript at 2731-33, State v. Horace Williams, No. 86-9275 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 10,
1988). However, he did give an instruction as to the defense of voluntary intoxication. Id. at
2733-34.
12. Sentence, State v. Williams, No. 86-9257 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed June 10,
1988). Dr. David Katz, co-author of this Article, who had testified at Williams's trial, feels
that the trial judge may have spared Williams from the electric chair due to the steroid
testimony, even though the jury rejected it as a basis for acquittal. Katz's claim is supported
by the judge's refusal to sentence Williams to death despite the judge's comment that it was
"one of the most brutal cases in all my years in this business." See Killer Sentenced, Miami
Herald, June 11, 1988, at 22A, col. 1. Cf. Transcript at 2821, State v. Horace Williams, No.
86-9275 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 10, 1988) ("[B]ased on the facts that I know of this case,
I am not going to impose the death penalty."). Horace Williams's conviction is currently on
appeal to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal (No. 88-2094).
13. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
14. See Pope & Katz, Affective and Psychotic Symptoms Associated With Anabolic
Steroid Use, 145 AM. J. PSYCHiATRy 487 (1988). See also Pope & Katz, supra note 10, at 28-
31 (describing three anonymous men (actually Woolstrum, Horace Williams, and Boblett),
each having no history of violence or antisocial personality disorder, who impulsively com-
mitted violent crimes while taking anabolic steroids, and arguing that structured psychiatric
interviews of each man indicate that anabolic steroids played an integral role in the etiology
of the violent behavior).
15. Modern athletes often engage in sophisticated regimens of steroid use, combining
many different steroids for optimal effect. For a more detailed explanation of this practice,
generically known as stacking, see infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. These steroids,
in most cases, have not been tested together clinically. Consequently, their effect on the
user's mental status is undocumented and remains unpredictable. See infra notes 36 & 92
and accompanying text.
16. Pope & Katz, supra note 14. See infra note 108 for a definition of "psychosis."
19891
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and effect of anabolic steroids; in addition, the section attempts to
illustrate the distinction between the well-documented side effects,
both physiological and psychological,17 and the newly documented
side effect of psychosis. Section III then discusses the various theo-
ries that a criminal defendant might advance to prevent the prose-
cution from proving that the defendant possessed the requisite
mental state appurtenant to the crime with which the defendant
has been charged. Section III specifically considers whether the
mental state potentially produced by steroid use is sufficient under
Florida law to establish: (1) an insanity defense-this Article con-
cludes that it is not; (2) a voluntary intoxication defense-this Ar-
ticle concludes that it is, but that it will provide a defense only to
individuals charged with specific intent crimes and, hence, mitiga-
tion, as opposed to complete exculpation, normally will result; (3)
an involuntary intoxication defense-this Article finds that, be-
cause most users of steroids presently are unaware of the potential
for psychiatric repercussions to accompany steroid use, involuntary
intoxication will be an effective theory for avoiding criminal re-
sponsibility; however, this Article concludes that as users become
educated to the drugs' potential for producing psychiatric reper-
cussions, the utility of this defense will diminish. Because it conve-
niently lacks any statutory or judge-made law either recognizing or
rejecting involuntary intoxication as a defense, Florida law will
serve as the laboratory for this analysis. Finally, this Article con-
cludes with the authors' admonition to defense counsel, prosecu-
tors, and the bench that they apprise themselves of the potential
issues that may arise when the state charges an anabolic steroid
user with a crime.
II. ANABOLIC STEROIDS
A. What Are They?
Anabolic steroids are synthetic analogues of the male hormone
testosterone that closely simulate the effects of natural, or endoge-
nous, testosterone on the human body."8 The drugs initially were
17. Throughout this Article, the terms "psychological" and "psychiatric" are used in-
terchangeably to indicate specific reference to an individual's mental state-including cogni-
tive and emotional functions.
18. See Haupt & Rovere, Anabolic Steroids: A Review of the Literature, 12 AM. J.
SPORTS MED. 469 (1984). Synthetically produced steroids are preferable to pure testosterone
in that the synthetic analogues "have been modified to prolong their presence in the blood-
stream and to minimize their masculinizing (androgenic) effects." Testimony Before the
House Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. I
[Vol. 7:1
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expected to meet a wide spectrum of medical needs; 9 however, to-
day they are rarely used in treating disease or injury.20 Their pre-
dominant use is in improving athletic performance.2 Specifically,
athletes administer these chemical compounds to promote the syn-
thesis of proteins used to build skeletal muscle.22 When used by
athletes under optimal conditions, steroids are believed to increase
strength and size, while at the same time allowing for a reduction
in body fat.2
B. Methods Of Use
Steroids are administered in one of two ways: they may be in-
jected intramuscularly or taken in tablet form.2 ' Although the nor-
(July 27, 1988) (statement of Charles E. Yesalis III, Sc. D., Professor of Health and Human
Development, The Pennsylvania State University). The brand names of some of the more
frequently implemented anabolic steroids are Dianabol, Anavar, Deca-Durabolin, and Win-
strol V. For an informative, exhaustive discussion of the specific anabolic steroids imple-
mented today, see D. DUCHAINE, UNDERGROUND STEROID HANDBOOK II 27-46 (1989). In addi-
tion to anabolic steroids, athletes also are known to implement Human Growth Hormone
(HGH) as an anabolic agent. However, the use of HGH currently is limited because it is
prohibitively expensive. Curtis, State of the Art: Drugs, MUSCLEMAG, May 1989, at 117. For
extensive discussions of Human Growth Hormone, see W. TAYLOR, ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND
THE ATHLETE 69-82 (1982) and D. DUCHAINE, supra, at 74-76.
19. Taylor, Super Athletes Made To Order, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1985, at 64. Re-
searchers originally expected anabolic steroids to accelerate the healing of bone fractures,
muscle and tendon injuries, and burns, as well as to facilitate the treatment of such condi-
tions as malnutrition and post-menopausal osteoporosis in women. Id. Today, the two
widely accepted medical uses of anabolic steroids are for treating certain types of anemia
and for replacement therapy in hypogonadal males. Cowart, Steroids In Sports: After Four
Decades Time To Return These Genies To Bottle?, 257 J. A.M.A. 421, 423 (1987). "Today,
however, there are only a few approved steroids on the market. For example, nandrolone
phenpropionate is available for the treatment of certain types of breast cancer; nandrolone
decanoate for anemia caused by renal failure; and oxymetholone for aplastic anemia." In-
dictment at 2, United States v. Cambra, Crim. No. 89-0854K (S.D. Cal. filed August 25,
1989).
20. Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
21. Although the Nazis allegedly used anabolic steroids to increase troop aggressive-
ness in World War II, see Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 469, the drugs were not intro-
duced to the world of sport until the Soviets began experimenting with the drugs in the
early 1950's. Id. at 469.
22. See Lamb, Anabolic Steroids, in ERGOGENIC AIDS IN SPORT 164 (M. Williams ed.
1983). The body can build tissue only when in a state called "positive nitrogen balance." See
Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 474. Although the exact mechanics of their effects are
not fully known, it seems that steroids promote protein synthesis by increasing nitrogen
retention. See Recognizing Anabolic Steroid Abuse, PATIENT CARE, Aug. 15, 1985, at 28
(prepared by Janet P. Cranshaw) [hereinafter PATIENT CARE]. Some studies have reported
that anabolic steroid use stimulates quicker recovery from workouts, allowing athletes to
train harder and more frequently. Id. at 30.
23. W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 3.
24. See Lamb, Anabolic Steroids in Athletics: How Well Do They Work and How
Dangerous Are They?, 12 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 31 (1984). For an outstanding discussion of
1989]
7
Bidwill and Katz: Injecting New Life into an Old Defense: Anabolic Steroid-Induced
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
mal therapeutic dose of steroids typically is 30-60 mg./day, athletes
who use steroids far exceed these amounts. 25 Moreover, a new, and
possibly more dangerous approach to steroid use has emerged re-
cently. This process, called "stacking," commonly is implemented
by the athlete in an attempt to maximize the efficacy of the
drugs. 26 Stacking entails the use of combinations of different ster-
oids, simultaneously and often at high doses, so as to achieve the
most beneficial results.17 As stacking becomes more popular, the
dangers of steroid use may be increased dramatically. Increased
dosages and new, untested steroid combinations push the athlete
into an area unexplored by scientists.2" Strength is maximized,29
but significantly, so are the risks of dangerous, unforeseen side
effects."0
the mechanics and potential implications of injecting anabolic steroids, see D. DUCHAINE,
supra note 18, at 69-73. "Ironically, the injected anabolic steroid ... is considered a much
safer drug than its oral derivatives. Injectable steroids are usually less liver toxic than
orals." Id. at 69. Nonetheless, some may be more toxic to the kidneys. Id. at 19.
Although Duchaine argues that modern athletes are "extremely hygienic, selective, ac-
tually idiosyncratic about their selection and use of hypodermic needles," and that the "in-
cidence of 'bad' shots or infections is extraordinarily low," an issue remains which the con-
temporary literature seems not to have addressed. Specifically, it is unclear how many
steroid users have contracted the AIDS virus as a result of their hypodermic needle use. As
the virus is transferred frequently by intravenous drug users who share needles, the poten-
tial exists for the same type of phenomenon to occur within the ranks of anabolic steroid
users who ingest steroids by injection.
25. MacDougall, Anabolic Steroids, PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, Sept. 1983, at 95,
97. Male athletes have been reported to use 150-200 mg./day, while females reportedly use
50-75 mg./day. Id. However, undocumented reports have claimed intake as high as 2000
mg./day. Lamb, supra note 24, at 32. These numbers are staggering in light of the human
body's natural production of only 1700-3700 mg. of testosterone per year. B. GOLDMAN, P.
BUSH & R. KLATZ, DEATH IN THE LOCKER ROOM 82 (1984) [hereinafter GOLDMAN].
26. See generally D. DUCHAINE, supra note 18, at 49-59 (discussing usage and dosage
of anabolic steroids, including an analysis of the efficacy, safety, and legality of certain
"stacks"); Curtis, supra note 18, at 17 (providing an informative discussion of safe anabolic
steroid "stacks").
27. See Lamb, supra note 24, at 33. With a pre-competition stack, the athlete progres-
sively decreases his dosage as the competition nears to minimize the risk of detection. Id. at
33. See also Smith, Catch Me If You Can! How the Pros Beat the Drug Test, MUSCLEMAG,
Dec./Jan. 1988-89, at 128 (outlining various detection avoiding techniques); D. DUCHAINE,
supra note 18, at 80-81 (explaining how to beat a drug test). See generally W. TAYLOR, supra
note 18, at 27 for a discussion of "stacking."
28. Id. at 28.
29. MacDougall, supra note 25, at 97 (noting that high doses result in maximal
performance).
30. Lamb, supra note 24, at 33. It is clear that stacking has created the need for bet-
ter, more realistic research. See W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 28.
(Vol. 7:1
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C. Efficacy Of Anabolic Steroids
Whether steroids really do enhance athletic performance has
been, not surprisingly, the subject of a great deal of contentious
debate. Some studies claim that, at the least, the evidence as to the
efficacy of steroid use in enhancing athletic performance is incon-
clusive, if indeed, the evidence does not indicate that they have no
effect at all. 1 Others claim, more persuasively, that steroid use,
when combined with heavy weight training and a particular diet,
will result in precipitous increases in size and strength.3 ' Further,
the claimed benefits have not been solely physiological. Steroid use
has been documented to enhance athletic performance through its
psychological effects, as well.
3
What is the reason for such divergent reports? A number of
factors are responsible, especially inconsistent " and ineffective
studies.35 Because the medical profession considers it unethical to
31. See, e.g., Wilson & Griffin, The Use and Misuse of Androgens, 29 METABOLISM
1278, 1283-84 (1980); Lamb, supra note 22, at 167. See also 1988 PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFER-
ENCE 1976 (E. Barnhart, publisher) [hereinafter PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE] (including a
conspicuous admonition to physicians that "ANABOLIC STEROIDS DO NOT ENHANCE
ATHLETIC ABILITY.").
32. E.g., Pope & Katz, supra note 14, at 488; W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 21; Mac-
Dougall, supra note 25, at 97; Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 474. See also Taylor,
Synthetic Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids: A Plea For Controlled Substance Status, PHYSI-
ClAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, May 1987, at 140, 144 (noting that the American College of Sports
Medicine revised its previously incredulous stand on the efficacy of anabolic steroids to con-
cede that "concurrent use of steroids and training with a proper diet may enhance athletic
performance."). Pope and Katz report a stunning example:
[A]n 18 year old man, 72 in. tall, reported that before steroid use he weighed 135
lbs. and could perform the squat (a deep knee bend with a barbell supported on
the shoulders) for one or two repetitions with 135 lbs. Two years later ... after
four cycles of steroids totalling 55 weeks, he weighed 230 lbs. (with a low percent
of body fat) and reported a squat of 655 lbs.
Pope & Katz, supra note 14, at 488.
33. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 475. To support their claim that anabolic
steroids may have a psychological effect, Haupt and Rovere referred to a study in which
athletes were given a placebo and told it was the anabolic steroid methandrostenolone (di-
anabol). Id. They noted that "[taking the placebo and thinking that it was an anabolic
steroid supplied the necessary psychological motivation for the atheletes to increase their
strength over what would have been expected in the absence of an anabolic steroid." Id.
Well-known psychological side effects also may benefit competitors in certain sports. For
example, increased aggression often is mentioned as a side effect of anabolic steroid use. See
infra note 90 and accompanying text. Interestingly, increased aggression, while labeled an
unwanted side effect by some, is potentially a desired effect in the eyes of others. See T.
DONOHOE & N. JOHNSON, FOUL PLAY: DRUG ABUSE IN SPORTS 50-51 (1986) ("Clearly some
[football players] would use anabolic steroids to increase their bulk but, in view of their
suggested effects on aggression, they could also be used for psychological reasons.").
34. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 476 (noting that "studies with consistent
protocols yielded consistent results.").
35. See Lamb, supra note 24, at 33-34 (noting that most studies on humans are inef-
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administer large doses of anabolic steroids to healthy humans,
studies of steroids in athletics have used significantly smaller doses
than those actually utilized by modern athletes in the field; conse-
quently, these studies have been unrealistic, necessitating the
avoidance of generalization with respect to their results."6
Regardless of these contrasting research results, the athletes
themselves are absolutely certain that anabolic steroids aid their
performance. 7 Consequently, because athletes have used anabolic
steroids and seen their precipitous effects, they have come to
doubt the veracity of the claims of the physicians and the medical
publications that steroids will not enhance athletic performance.
This skepticism has had a disconcerting effect: the athletes simi-
larly have doubted and even disregarded the physicians' warnings
as to the deleterious side effects which may accompany steroid
use.3
8
D. The Steroid Sources
1. Physicians
Athletes obtain anabolic steroids from a variety of sources. Al-
though athletes primarily obtain steroids in a vast, multifaceted
black market, prescribing physicians provide a significant amount
of the anabolic steroids used today.3 ' Steroids can be prescribed
legally and some physicians have not been hesitant to do so, even
for non-medical purposes.40
fective because the lack of a satisfactory placebo makes performing a double blind experi-
ment impossible).
36. See id. at 34.
37. See T. DONOHOE & N. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 39.
38. See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 481; Janofsky & Alfano, Victory At Any
Cost: Drug Pressure Growing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1988, at 1, 34, col. 1 (quoting a noted
sportsmedicine physician: "It may take generations of athletes before they'll believe us
again.").
. 39. See GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 78-82. The percentage of steroids obtained via
physicians has been reported to be as high as 35-40%. See, e.g., MacDougall, supra note 25,
at 96; Strauss, Wright, Finerman & Catlin, Side Effects of Anabolic Steroids In Weight
Trained Men, PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEICcINE, Dec. 1983, at 87, 91 [hereinafter Strauss]. How-
ever, recent reports have put the number closer to 20%. Cowart, Some Predict Increased
Steroid Use In Sports Despite Drug Testing, Crackdown on Suppliers, 257 J. A.M.A. 3025
(1987). Cf. D. DuCHAINE, supra note 18, at 82 ("It is just about impossible anywhere in
America to find an MD or osteopath, young, old, good, bad, or even greedy to write prescrip-
tions for steroids.").
40. See Cowart, Would Controlled Substance Status Affect Steroid Trafficking?, PHY-
SICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, May 1987, at 151, 152; W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 2 ("Since
anabolic steroids are prescription drugs, federal law prohibits the dispensing of them with-
out a prescription from a medical doctor."). However, several emerging factors may curtail
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Physicians prescribe steroids for various reasons. While some
do so purely for monetary gain, others prescribe in order to satisfy
a desire to be affiliated with a sports team or a superstar.'1 More
commonly, however, physicians will prescribe steroids claiming
that to do so is in the best interests of the athletes themselves.'2
Some physicians reason that because athletes clearly believe in the
efficacy of the anabolic steroids and, consequently, will obtain and
use the drugs regardless of whether they can do so through a phy-
sician, it would be better if they received and used them under
medical supervision.' s Although accurate, this reasoning is myopic.
For example, such thinking fails to recognize that many athletes
who employ clinical regimens from physicians vastly supplement
their quantities from black market sources."
the rampant prescription of anabolic steroids for sports purposes. First, there has been legis-
lation enacted at both the state and federal levels that regulates the prescription of anabolic
steroids. See infra note 216. Second, physicians increasingly are becoming aware of the mal-
practice implications that arise from the drugs' serious side effects. See Miller, Athletes and
Steroids: Playing A Deadly Game, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 1987, at 18. See also Curtis, supra
note 18, at 17 (reporting that physicians are less willing than ever to prescribe),
41. See Murphy, Steroids: Not Just For Athletes Anymore, PHYSICIAN & SPORT-
SMEDICINE, June 1986, at 48 (quoting a sportsmedicine physician who remarked that "[a]
number of physicians will prescribe steroids for monetary gain and because they want to
develop an affiliation with a team."); Burns, Steroids Tied To Runner's Doctor, N.Y. Times,
October 7, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (claiming that Ben Johnson's physician prescribed the steroids
which led to Johnson's Olympic disqualification).
42. See Miller, Anabolic Steroids: An Australian Sports Physician Goes Public, PHY-
SICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, Nov. 1986, at 167. Since the black market sources may provide
drugs which are of dubious content and quality, physicians claim that in prescribing the
drugs, and then monitoring their use, the athlete can be protected from the inherent dan-
gers of obtaining the drugs on the black market and of using them without supervision. Id.
Further, the level of expertise of some who distribute anabolic steroids on the black market
is alarmingly low, and, consequently, these dealers provide the user with either poor advice
as to proper use or, alternatively, with no advice at all. See S. CHINERY, ANABOLIC STEROIDS
AND BODYBUILDING 76 (1983). This proposition, however, necessarily is qualified because the
level of expertise of some black market steroid dealers is alarmingly high. Telephone inter-
view with Phillip Halpern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California (Sept.
26, 1989). Halpern's belief is corroborated vividly by noting that Dan Duchaine, author of
the insightful UNDERGROUND STEROID HANDBOOK, was himself a steroid dealer. In any case,
the black market supply is abundant. In fact, the Department of Justice currently believes
that the black market is approximately $200-400 million per year. Indictment at 3, United
States v. Carnbra, Crim. No. 89-0854K (S.D. Cal. filed Aug. 25, 1989).
43. See Miller, supra note 42, at 167; Duda, Do Anabolic Steroids Pose An Ethical
Dilemma For U.S. Physicians?, PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, Nov. 1986, at 173.
44. See Miller, supra note 42, at 170; Duda, supra note 43, at 173. Athletes are forced
to the black market for other reasons beyond the inability to obtain prescriptions of suffi-
cient size. For example, some American anabolic steroid users resort to the black market
simply because some steroids-like Finaject and Dianabol-are not available by prescrip-
tion in the United States. Telephone interview with Phillip Halpern, Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney, Southern District of California (Sept. 26, 1989). The FDA withdrew Dianabol (methan-
drostenolone), one of the most popular anabolic steroids, from its list of authorized drugs in
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Opinions within the medical community also vary. Some phy-
sicians claim that steroid use, when closely supervised, is no more
dangerous than using other prescription drugs.45 Others find that
any prescription of anabolic steroids for non-medical purposes is
unethical."' In any light, it is obvious that although physicians har-
bor a wide variety of attitudes and opinions, they remain a poten-
tial source for anabolic steroids.'7
2. The Black Market
The amount of steroids prescribed by physicians is dwarfed by
the amount obtained through the black market."' Conservatively
reported to be as large as 200-400 million dollars gross per year,"e
the black market has been credited with contributing as much as
eighty percent of the steroids used by American athletes.50 More-
over, this black market is as heterogeneous in its makeup as it is
overwhelming in its size. Veterinarians, pharmaceutical industry
employees, coaches, and athletic trainers all are among those who
provide anabolic steroids to the athlete."'
1985. Indictment at 7, United States v. Jenkins, Crim. No. 87-0491-JLI (S.D. Cal. filed May
20, 1987). In fact, today there are very few approved steroids on the market. See supra note
19.
45. See W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 3 ("It can be shown that prescribing anabolic
steroids to athletes in a controlled fashion with regular physician follow up visits is less
dangerous than prescribing many if not most of the medication currently available.").
46. See Duda, supra note 43, at 174 (quoting a prominent sportsmedicine physician:
"It is highly unethical for any physician to prescribe steroids .... The first rule of medicine
is to do no harm to the individual and there is no safe way for an individual to use these
drugs or for a physician to guarantee the absence of any long-term effects.").
47. Some have claimed that many physicians who do prescribe steroids do so without
fully understanding the effects they have on the human body. See, e.g., Duda, supra note
43, at 174. See also Janofsky & Alfano, A Guru Who Spreads the Gospel of Steroids, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1988, at 30, col.1 (noting that The Underground Steroid Handbook suggests
to potential users that they look either to amoral "young doctors," or alternatively to the
"quack doctor" who routinely and indiscriminately writes prescriptions). However, many
physicians who prescribe steroids clearly are not "quacks." See Miller, supra note 42, at 168
(noting that one physician who prescribes steroids is a "world renowned pioneer in sports
medicine therapy and research with an order of the British Empire awarded by the Queen
for recognition of his service to his profession.").
48. See Alfano & Janofsky, On the Black Market, Drugs Are In Easy Reach Of Pub-
lic, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at 1, 48, col. 1; Eisendrath, Confessions of A Steroid Smug-
gler, MUSCLE & FITNESS, Oct. 1988, at 158.
49. Indictment at 3, United States v. Cambra, Crim. No. 89-0854K (S.D. CaL filed
August 25, 1989).
50. Cowart, supra note 39, at 3025.
51. See Lamb, supra note 24, at 32 (veterinarians and pharmaceutical employees);
MacDougall, supra note 25, at 96 (athletic trainers); Johnson, Steroids: A Problem of Huge
Dimensions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 13, 1985, at 40 (coaches). Cf. Phillips, Final Chance
For a Coach, Miami Herald, Nov. 28, 1989, at 4D, col. 1 (reporting that a high school wres-
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Although distributing steroids without a prescription is illegal
in the United States, 2 obtaining the drugs is easy because in many
Latin American and Eastern European countries anabolic steroids
are available over the counter.5 3 Since Mexico is among these na-
tions, there consequently has been a direct faucet running from
Mexican pharmacies to the gyms and health clubs of the United
States."
The presence of such a large, multifaceted black market cre-
ates a social crisis. Black marketeers often have no incentive to
look out for the athletes' interests and will sell them virtually any-
thing."5 As a result, users frequently buy steroids unaware of the
ding coach monitored and advised his team members who were using steroids). See also S.
CHINERY, supra note 42, at 75-76 (claiming that the corner drug hustler also sells steroids);
Murphy, supra note 41, at 48 (claiming users sell drugs to subsidize their own habits).
Moreover, an FDA agent recently claimed that the steroid market has witnessed the influx
of a hardened criminal element, supplanting the "good ol' boy" network that previously
coordinated traffic in the drugs. Morrison, Status Report: Steroids In America, PowFRLitsr-
ING USA, Oct. 1989, at 23 (interviewing FDA agent Don Leggett).
52. 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(e)(1) (West Supp. 1989) (imposing criminal liability upon "any
person who distributes or possesses with the intent to distribute any anabolic steroid for any
use in humans other than the treatment of disease pursuant to the order of a physi-
cian .... "). See also infra note 247 (illustrating how the distribution of anabolic steroids
without a prescription alternatively is illegal pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1982)). Mere
possession of anabolic steroids, although criminal in some states, is not in violation of fed-
eral law. See infra note 247.
53. See GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 90-93. Aside from the dealers who use foreign
countries as a source, many athletes obtain the drugs while competing abroad. See Lamb,
supra note 24, at 32.
54. See Indictment, United States v. Jenkins, Crim. No. 87-0491-JLI (S.D. Cal. filed
May 20, 1987) (outlining a large conspiracy which included among its overt acts the impor-
tation into the United States of Mexican manufactured anabolic steroids); GOLDMAN, supra
note 25, at 92-93; Altman, Concern Grows Over Steroids: Health Dangers Are Cited, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1988, at D32, col. 1 ("[Steroids] are easily obtained from mail order compa-
nies that buy them in Mexico and abroad .... ). In fact, steroid laboratories in Mexico
bottle anabolic steroids with English language labels. Telephone interview with Phillip Hal-
pern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California (Sept. 26, 1989). See also
Eisendrath, supra note 48, at 249 ("An advertisement in the March 31 issue of the San
Diego Reader underscores how readily available they remain. It touts the 'best stocked
pharmacy in Tijuana.. . (for) bodybuilders... steroids.' A phone number and address are
listed and customers are asked to call in advance 'for large orders.' ").
55. In fact "[the FDA has recently become aware that 'counterfeit' steroids are flood-
ing the black market in response to the growing demand [for the drugs]." Indictment at 3,
United States v. Cambra, Crim. No. 89-0854K (S.D. Cal. filed Aug. 25, 1989). "These ster-
oids are counterfeit in that they falsely represent, without authorization, they are the prod-
ucts of legitimate drug manufacturers." Id. Counterfeit steroids present serious problems
because they may be subpotent or superpotent, or even can be mislabeled-for example,
nandrolone could appear in a bottle labeled methandrostenolone. Telephone interview with
Phillip Halpern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California (Sept. 26, 1989).
Moreover, as steroids of questionable cleanliness are available on the black market, there is
an increased risk that users may experience anaphylactic shock (septic shock)-an allergic
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true nature and quality of the drugs they purchase. Many igno-
rantly, yet innocently, put their trust, and perhaps their lives, into
the hands of the dealers; at the same time, these dealers often have
virtually no knowledge of the mechanics of the human body or of
the proper use of the chemicals they are peddling."' Worse yet, the
users themselves are often unarmed with any medical knowledge
and, consequently, they grossly misuse the steroids, maximizing
the potential side effects and minimizing the gains.5 7
3. Control Efforts
Attempts to control America's steroid problem have not fo-
cused solely on the athletes themselves, but have targeted the sup-
ply element as well. Control efforts have been aimed at the black
market suppliers,58 the physicians who prescribe the drugs for non-
reaction to the ingestion of a certain compound into the human body that may, if severe,
result in unconsciousness or even death. D. DUCHAINE, supra note 18, at 69. At times, how-
ever, counterfeit steroids may be innocuous. For example, some have been found to be
merely plain oil. Telephone interview with Phillip Halpern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, South-
ern District of California (Sept. 26, 1989). See also Neff & Sullivan, The People Helper,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 23, 1985, at 26 (documenting a major west coast steroid dealer
who sells athletes an androgenic-anabolic steroid called Mibrolone, which is approved for
use only by veterinarians to prevent female dogs from going into heat); Alfano & Janofsky,
supra note 48, at 1, 48 (discussing the serious problem caused by the increased influx of
counterfeit steroids into the black market); D. DUCHAINE, supra note 18, at 20-21 (providing
an excellent discussion of the etiology of the counterfeit steroid phenomenon).
56. One report documents a study in which steroids were purchased from eight black
market dealers:
All eight 'prescribed' a different method of taking the drugs .... Upon talking
to each dealer, it was obvious none of them had any idea what anabolic steroids
really were. Seven of the eight recommended usage plans which entailed danger-
ously high dosages. The frightening thing here was the fact that these dealers
appeared competent, knowledgeable, and trustworthy to the young naive
bodybuilders upon whom they preyed.
S. CHINERY, supra note 42, at 75-76.
57. See id. at 74-75.
58. State efforts directed at the black market supply have been half-hearted in part
because the public believes the dangers of steroids are not as serious as those presented by
cocaine or heroin. Johnson, supra note 51, at 49-51. However, recently there has been a
legitimate effort to eliminate, or at least vastly reduce, the black market. Cowart, supra note
39, at 3025 ("A task force was formed [in 19861 by the Justice Department, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Food and Drug Administration to move against suspected
dealers. Several convictions have been obtained, and the penalties that can be levied are
harsher because of changes in the penalty section of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Bill."). Phillip Halpern, an Assistant United States Attorney who has prosecuted numerous
individuals for steroid related offenses, approximates that recent federal efforts to eradicate
the black market have resulted in about 200 convictions. Telephone interview with Phillip
Halpern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California (Sept. 26, 1989). Halpern
believes that these recent efforts have resulted in a severe dislocation in the steroid market;
importation has been stymied and the market has shifted towards more domestic counter-
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medical purposes," and the users themselves.6 0 While steroids are
far from being eliminated, these efforts to reduce availability are
very timely for the use and abuse of anabolic steroids is quickly
taking its well-deserved place on America's list of social concerns.
E. Widespread Use
1. World Class Athletes and Professionals
The use of anabolic steroids is widespread in modern sports."
As one might expect, steroid use permeates sports such as weight-
lifting, football, and bodybuilding, but surprising to many, some
literature now claims that the drugs are used to aid performance in
almost every other sport as well, including track and field, swim-
ming, rowing, boxing, cycling, and baseball."2 The use is especially
evident at the professional and international levels of competition.
While the numbers estimating use by all athletes are eye opening,63
the percentage of professional and international athletes who use
anabolic steroids is, in some sports, staggering. 4 Among such com-
feit production. Id. Cf. D. DUCHAINE, supra note 18, at 83 (noting that the importation of
steroids from Mexico currently is unwise due to the effectiveness of recent federal law en-
forcement efforts).
59. Efforts to limit the prescription of steroids for non-medical purposes have begun
to emerge on both the state and federal levels. See infra note 216.
60. Attempts to limit demand have appeared in two forms. Most obvious is the in-
creased testing for the use of anabolic steroids that sports leagues and organizations have
begun to adopt. See Janofsky & Alfano, System Accused of Failing Test Posed By Drugs,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Although the intention is good, these methods are
costly and are still easy to circumvent. Smith, supra note 27, at 128. Thus, since the likeli-
hood of detection is still low for an athlete well-versed in detection avoiding techniques, and
since the athletic benefits of steroid use are significant, anabolic steroids continue to be an
attractive option for modern athletes. See Janofsky & Alfano, supra note 38, at 34.
The second method authorities have used in an attempt to limit demand has been to
increase the criminal culpability of those who possess the steroids without a prescription.
See, e.g., 1987 Fla. Laws 87-243 (amending FLA. STAT. § 893.03 to make anabolic steroids a
controlled substance and, as such, subjecting those who unlawfully possess anabolic steroids
to criminal sanctions pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (Supp. 1988)).
61. Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18. at 469; Pope & Katz, supra note 14, at 487.
62. PATIENT CARE, supra note 22, at 30; Miller, supra note 40, at 18 (reporting ana-
bolic steroid use by baseball players).
63. See Pope, Katz, & Champoux, Anabolic-Androgenic Steroid Use Among 1,010
College Men, PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINI, July 1988, at 75, "81 ("[T]he total number of
men who have used steroids in the United States is in the hundreds of thousands."); Taylor,
supra note 19, at 64 ("According to my conservative estimate more than a million American
athletes and fitness buffs are using anabolic steroids .... ).
64. See Lamb, supra note 24, at 32 ("[Slources suggest that anabolic steroids are used
by 80-100% of national and international-caliber male bodybuilders, weightlifters and par-
ticipants in the shot put, discus, hammer and javelin throws .... "). See also Telephone
interview with Robert "Tony" Urrutia, member 1988 U.S. Olympic Weightlifting Team
(Nov. 14, 1988) (Asked whether steroids were a factor in the 1988 Seoul games, Urrutia
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petitors there is little doubt that drug use is a necessary partner to
training, diet, and psychological preparation. 5
2. Low Level Amateurs and Youngsters
Steroid use is not confined, however, to professionals and
other athletes of the highest caliber. Steroid use has spread. The
glory and money of professional and international competition
markedly has increased the incentive for young amateurs to use
the drugs."e This incentive has led to steroid use in colleges, 7 high
schools,68 and even grade schools.69 In fact, one study has sug-
gested that as many as 500,000 adolescents in the United States
have used or are currently using anabolic steroids."0
responded: "You could see it in the people's attitudes and in their performances. It was
obvious that steroids were a factor.").
It must be noted, however, that "the amount and frequency of steroid use has been
difficult to detect at all levels of sport . . . because athletes are reluctant to participate in
drug use surveys." Duda, Gouging Steroid Use In High School Kids, PHYSICIAN & SPORT-
SMEDICINE, Aug. 1988, at 16-17.
65. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 87-88; Johnson, supra note 51, at 52 (quoting former
NFL lineman Steve Courson as saying: "I know that if I don't use steroids, I won't be the
best I can be.").
66. See Johnson, supra note 51, at 43-44.
67. See Pope, Katz, & Champoux, supra note 63, at 76-77 (reporting that 17% of in-
tercollegiate athletes responding to study admitted using steroids); Dezelsky, Toohey, &
Shaw, Non-Medical Drug Use Behavior At Five United States Universities: A 15 Year
Study, 37 BULL. NARCOTICS 49 (1985) (reporting that 20% of intercollegiate athletes admit-
ted to using steroids). See also NCAA Does Off-Season Testing For Steroids, PHYSICIAN &
SPORTSMEDICINE, Apr. 1988, at 49 (noting that a 1985 NCAA study revealed that about nine
percent of intercollegiate football players had used anabolic steroids, and that the usage rate
may be as high as 50% among lineman-positions which require more strength and weight
than the so-called "skill" positions).
68. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 48 ("[Tjhe use of anabolic steroids in high schools
is becoming epidemic . )..."); Duda, supra note 64, at 16-17 ("A recent survey of high school
juniors, both athletes and non-athletes, from six Arkansas schools found that 95 of 853 boys
(11.1%) had used or were using steroids .... "). See also Phillips & Lohrer, High Schools
Considering Steroid Tests, Miami Herald, Jan. 14, 1989, at ID, col. 1 (reporting that the
Florida High School Activities Association is considering the implementation of a steroid
testing program); Deters, Teen Steroid Use, MUSCLE & FITNESS, May 1988, at 72 (discussing
steroid use among youngsters); Yesalis, Why Children Use Steroids, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1988, at 25, col. 1 (discussing the possible incentives for young persons to use anabolic
steroids).
69. See Drug Abuse By Athletes, AMERICAN DRUGGIST, Sept. 1987, at 43; Miller, supra
note 40, at 17; Lamb, supra note 24, at 32.
70. Buckley, Yesalis, Friedl, Anderson, Streit, & Wright, Estimated Prevalence of An-
abolic Steroid Use Among Male High School Seniors, 260 J. A.M.A. 3441, 3445 (1988). In
order to establish the prevalence of anabolic steroid use among male adolescents, research-
ers conducted a nationwide study of 3,400 12th grade males in 46 private and public schools,
from both urban and rural areas of the United States. Id. at 3441-42. The results show that
6.6% of 12th grade males either use or have used anabolic steroids, with two-thirds of this
user group having begun their use at the age of 16 or younger. Id. at 3441. Further, 38.3% of
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3. Reasons For Steroid Abuse
Athletes use and abuse anabolic steroids primarily for three
overlapping reasons: to obtain a winning edge on their competition;
because of pressures to use the drugs; and, finally, because of the
great rewards our society bestows upon its successful athletes.
a. The Winning Edge
Ostensibly, modern athletes use steroids in order to obtain the
winning edge.7 In high level competition, where miniscule
amounts separate the champions from the also-rans, an artificial
aid can be the difference that catapults an athlete to the top. For
world class athletes, finding this winning edge may be the differ-
ence that allows them to capture goals to which they have dedi-
cated their lives.72 Similarly, for the professional, maintaining the
winning edge could mean the difference between having a high-
paying job and collecting an unemployment check. s
b. Pressure
Steroid use is also a consequence of pressures placed upon
athletes. The form in which that pressure appears is usually de-
pendent upon the level of competition. Younger and lower level
the user group began their use at age 15 or younger. Id. at 3443. Equally suggestive is that
40% of the users reported five or more cycles of use, 44% responded that they had used
more than one drug at a time, and 38.1% had used both oral and injectable steroids. Id. at
3443. In addition, 21% of the users cited a health care professional as the primary source of
their anabolic steroids. Id. at 3441. Obviously, these figures lend credence to the Justice
Department's approximation that the black market in anabolic steroids is currently between
$200-400 million. See supra note 42.
Moreover, a telling example of the limitless application of the drugs is that many peo-
ple, especially high school boys, have begun using anabolic steroids for purely aesthetic pur-
poses, far removed from athletic competition. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 48. In fact, a
high school newspaper in Broward County, Florida, conducted an informal survey of 200
students in 1985. The survey indicated that 18% of the male students reported using ana-
bolic steroids, with 45% of the users citing appearance as the primary reason for using the
drug. Pope, Katz, & Champoux, supra note 63, at 76.
71. Lamb, supra note 24, at 31.
72. The desperation of the world class athlete is aptly elucidated by Goldman. He
asked 198 world class athletes the following question:
If I had a magic drug that was so fantastic that if you took it once you would win
every competition you would enter from the Olympic Decathlon to Mr. Universe,
for the next five years, but . . . it would kill you five years after you took
it-would you take the drug?
GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 32. 52% said yes. Id.
73. See Johnson, supra note 51, at 52 (quoting Steve Courson, Professional football
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amateurs are victims of parental7" and peer pressure. 75 Pressure
also is created when the average performance level in a given sport
has been improved significantly by steroid use so that it is no
longer feasible to compete without the drugs.76 This latter pressure
is the type most likely to influence participants in professional and
international competitions where the stakes are much higher:77 at
stake is not mere participation, but often a job or the end result of
a lifetime of effort. Additionally, an international competitor given
the opportunity to be the best in the world is burdened with in-
credible pressures to fulfill that potential.78 Moreover, at the pro-
fessional and international level, pressures often are heightened by
an athlete's belief that his competitors are using artificial aids."
c. Fame and Fortune
The pressures to use steroids are more graphically portrayed
when considering the last and most significant reason for pervasive
steroid use: the fame, glory, and especially the fortunes" which
American society bestows upon its successful athletes." Lured by
74. See Taylor, supra note 19, at 65 (claiming that the author has received calls from
parents inquiring as to the use of steroids and human growth hormone to enable average
sized children to grow bigger as well as offers of large sums of money to chemically manipu-
late their children).
75. Id. ("Peer pressure could be just as strong a motivator, [to use drugs] especially if
young athletes saw themselves being outstripped by the competition. It could become a case
of either take the drugs or don't play - you're not big enough.").
76. See Cowart, Study Proposes To Examine Football Players, Powerlifters For Pos-
sible Long-term Sequelae From Anabolic Steroid Use in 1970's Competition, 257 J. A.M.A.
3021 (1987) (noting the dilemma of one competitive weightlifter who became discouraged
and stopped competing because he saw other lifters of comparable ability surpass him when
they began taking steroids).
77. See Murray, Drug Testing and Moral Responsibility, PHYSICIAN & SPORT-
SMEDICINE, Nov. 1986, at 47 ("Athletes become trapped in a system in which they must
either use drugs ... or concede an advantage to their competitors.").
78. See Cowart, Physician-Competitor's Advice To Colleagues: Steroid Users Re-
spond To Education, Rehabilitation, 257 J. A.M.A. 427, 428 (1987) (quoting a former
Olympic athlete turned physician as saying: "Unless you've been in the position of being
potentially the best in the world, you can't understand that pressure.").
79. See id. at 428 ("An Olympic athlete has one shot at it and if he believes other
athletes are taking something ... he will want it too.").
80. See, e.g., Marino Tops NFL Salary List With $1.45 Million in 1988, Miami Her-
ald, Jan. 14, 1988, at 1D, col.1 (reporting that 13 NFL players made at least $1 million
dollars in 1988); Abrams, Sports Labor Relations: The Arbitrator's Turn At Bat, 5 ENT. &
SPORTS L.J. 1, 10 (1988) (noting that the current average annual salary for Major League
Baseball Players is $513,730.).
81. See GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 97 (quoting an excerpt from the International
Olympic Committee's Manual On Doping: "The merciless rigor of modern competitive
sport, especially at the international level, the glory of victory, and the growing social and
economical reward of sporting success increasingly forces athletes to improve their perform-
[Vol. 7:1
18
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/2
STEROID-INDUCED PSYCHOSIS
the fame and fortune that accompanies success, athletes often turn
to steroids to get the small boost without which they might fail."2
The handsome monetary rewards bestowed upon successful ath-
letes create visions of grandeur that may affect the decision mak-
ing ability of the not so successful, in some cases causing them to
blindly utilize any means to advance towards their lucrative goal,
regardless of the cost.83 Consequently, they fail to recognize, or if
aware, concern themselves with, the inherent risks of steroid use.
Although some reports claim steroiduse is beginning to slow, 4
others are not so optimistic. 5 Despite increased drug testing, ath-
letes still are using steroids in epidemic numbers.8 a This prevalent
steroid use is especially troubling in light of the well-documented
side effects attributed to anabolic steroids.
F. Well-Documented Side Effects
The deleterious side effects of anabolic steroid use are well
documented. a Most of these side effects are physiological.88 How-
ance by any means available."); Taylor, supra note 19, at 64-66.
82. See id. at 65.
83. See supra note 72.
84. See, e.g., Duda, supra note 43, at 175; Miller, supra note 40, at 21.
85. Some researchers do not foresee any drop off in anabolic steroid use in athletics,
but, instead, expect use to increase in the immediate future. Cowart, supra note 39, at 3025.
86. See Senate Panel Told of Steroids in N.F.L., N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at 50
(testimony before Senate Judiciary Committee reveals steroid use has reached major pro-
portions); Indictment, United States v. Cambra, Crim. No. 89-0854K (S.D. Cal. filed August
25, 1989) (noting that "the use of steroids to enhance athletic performance and appearance
has reached epidemic proportions among this nation's amateur and professional athletes.");
McGough, Debating The Drug Tests, MUSCLEMAG, Nov. 1989, at 65 (Mr. Olympia contender
Mike Quinn concedes that steroid use is probably at epidemic levels.). In fact, athletes are
utilizing incredible new methods to avoid detection. One example is the "urine transfusion"
some N.F.L. players allegedly have used recently to avoid a positive test. A technician cath-
eterizes the athlete, drains the steroid-loaded urine out of the athlete's bladder and replaces
it with clean urine. The athlete then passes the "clean" urine as his own. Johnson, Hit For
A Loss, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 19, 1988, at 51.
87. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 113-129; W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 62-68.
See generally D. DUCHAINE, supra note 18, at 60-68 (providing an alphabetical list of steroid
side effects, accompanied by a summary of the empirical and anecdotal evidence supporting
each one, and discussing the severity, possible avoidance, and potential treatment of each
condition).
88. The most serious physiological side effects associated with anabolic steroid use are
liver disorders, including liver cancer, and cardiovascular disease, usually in the form of
accelerated atherosclerosis. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 113-129. Anabolic steroids also are
known to bring on a number of other less serious side effects which are often gender-iso-
lated. W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 66-68. For example, women may experience gender-
isolated side effects such as alterations in their menstrual cycle, clitoral enlargement, reduc-
tion of breast tissue, deepening of the voice, and facial hair growth; men may experience
testicular atrophy or gynecomastia (breast enlargement). Id. at 67. See also Groves, The
1989]
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ever, some psychological side effects of steroid use also commonly
are perceived,89 especially the drugs' potential to increase aggres-
siveness.90 However, the psychological effects are, for obvious rea-
sons, hard to identify9" and, consequently, the research docu-
menting them is neither as developed nor as credible as that
dealing with their physiological counterparts. In terms of both
body and of mind, much is still unknown about anabolic steroids
and their deleterious effects."2
This paucity of information becomes glaring when the knowl-
edge of the user is considered. Athletes, and other users, usually
are aware that steroids carry with them some danger of side ef-
fects.' However, their information usually is based on rumor.9
Simply put, those who use anabolic steroids are either unaware of
the full breadth of the possible side effects or are plagued by
Rambo Drug, AM. HEALTH, Sept. 1987, at 43 (documenting the vicissitudes of a former world
class, female bodybuilder who abused steroids); Telander & Noden, The Death of an Ath-
lete, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 20, 1989, at 68 (reporting that anabolic steroid use allegedly
contributed to the death- of a high school football player).
89. See Taylor, supra note 19, at 64-65. Psychological changes which an athlete may
undergo while using anabolic steroids include increases in self-esteem, sex drive, appetite,
hostility, mental intensity, energy, tolerance to pain, and a desire to train intensely. Id. at
64.
90. Increased aggressiveness frequently is mentioned as a common side effect. See,
e.g., id. at 65 ("Increased, sometimes uncontrollable, aggression is just one consequence of
steroid use."). See also Katz & Pope, Psychiatric Effects of Anabolic Steroids in MUSCLE
DEVELOPMENT: NUTRITIONAL ALTERNATIVEs To ANABOLIC STEROIDS 41 (W. Garrett & T. Ma-
lone, eds. 1988) (Report of the Ross Symposium, Ross Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio) (re-
porting that "common" lore among athletes recognizes that changes in mood, temperament,
and personality are among the drugs' most characteristic effects); D. DUCHAINE, supra note
18, at 61 ("Even the most bonehead of steroid users knows that all the really good, effective
steroids: Testosterone, Anadrol, Dianabol, will make you more aggressive."). Although the
psychological side effects pose a greater problem for the athlete because they are an imme-
diate result of the drug use, normal behavior usually returns after use is ceased. See Taylor,
supra note 19, at 68. However, some psychological effects such as depression and addiction
may set in soon after use has ceased. See GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 136-141; Steroids &
Depression, MUSCLE & FITNESS, Jan. 1989, at 17 (reporting that a recent study claims to
have demonstrated that "steroid overloading corresponds with a depression syndrome com-
monly found among addicts . . . . Severe depression was experienced by all of the athletes
using steroids during their off-cycles."). Cf. Chaikin & Telander, The Nightmare of Ster-
oids, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at 82 (graphically recounting how anabolic steroids
drove a college footbail player to the brink of suicide).
91. Often the side effects reported are "subjective" and, as such, cannot be measured.
See Haupt & Rovere, supra note 18, at 476. Subjective side effects are "those an athlete
claimed to have had during the use of anabolic steroids." ld. (emphasis added).
92. Many researchers admit that little is known about the effects of anabolic steroids
on the human body, especially the mind. See, e.g., MacDougall, supra note 25, at 99; Taylor,
supra note 19, at 64.
93. PATIENT CARE, supra note 22, at 36.
94. Wilson & Griffin, supra note 31, at 1283.
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An athlete can attribute his lack of information to many
things including his mistrust of physicians," inaccurate sources of
information, 7 and his own experience with the drugs absent any
visible effects. 8e This lack of awareness and understanding con-
cerning steroids becomes an important consideration when at-
tempting to fully assess the social and, as this Article will discuss
below, the criminal implications of steroid abuse. 9
Obviously steroid use carries with it a grave risk of both physi-
ological and psychological harm that is well documented in the
literature. However, researchers commonly admit that they know
relatively little about the effects of anabolic steroids and that, as a
result, there is always the risk that unforeseen side effects will
emerge. This disclaimer of modern researchers has proven to have
been well-grounded for a dangerous side effect recently has become
linked to excessive steroid use. Distinguishable from the frequently
noted psychological side effects such as a tendency to increase ag-
gressiveness, new research has brought to light the possibility of an
additional, rarely mentioned side effect in the form of a
psychosis.10
G. Steroid-Induced Psychosis
In a recent study, conducted by interviewing a cross section of
95. See Yessis, Athletes & Drugs In Russia, MUSCLE & FITNESS, Dec. 1988, at 39, 172.
("American athletes ... are convinced that steroids will only make them bigger, stronger
and able to train harder. Many athletes in the US are either unaware of [the detrimental
side effects] or have chosen to ignore them. Thus many . . . athletes are jumping on the
steroid bandwagon wearing blinders.").
96. See Cowart, supra note 78; at 428; supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (not-
ing physicians' loss of credibility among steroid users).
97. Wilson & Griffin, supra note 31, at 1283. In fairness the authors must note that
the magazines which cover the "iron games" such as bodybuilding, powerlifting, and
olympic lifting all devote a considerable amount of press to the issue of anabolic steroids.
Further, informative books written by knowledgeable sources are advertised frequently in
these magazines. See, e.g., MUSCLE & FITNESS, Dec. 1988, at 252 (advertising six books which
address solely anabolic steroids or growth hormone). Even so, it is still unclear just how
much credence .the steroid user pays these sources.
98. Johnson, supra note 51, at 41. This phenomenon manifests itself when a steroid
user looks at a laundry list of side effects known today and responds, "Hey I don't have any
of thoseand therefore I have nothing to worry about." See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 51, at
4D (quoting a former steroid user: "They didn't hurt me, so I didn't see any harm in
them.").
99. See infra notes 114-268 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential
criminal implications of anabolic steroid use.
100. See Pope & Katz, Affective and Psychotic Symptoms Associated With Anabolic
Steroid Use, supra note 14.
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anabolic steroid users, the researchers' observations "suggest that
marked affective and/or psychotic symptoms may sometimes occur
in individuals who are taking anabolic steroids."101 The psychotic
symptoms included auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions,
delusions of reference, and delusions of grandeur.1 0 2 The research-
ers emphasized that this condition was rarely if ever mentioned in
the past.103 Their statement is strongly supported by examining
the great amount of literature that extensively addresses the issue
of steroid-induced side effects without mentioning a psychosis.104
101. Id. at 487.
To assess the frequency of affective and psychotic symptoms in athletes tak-
ing anabolic steroids, the authors performed structured interviews of 41
bodybuilders and football players who had used steroids. According to DSM-III-
R [Diagnostic Statistical Manual, 3d edition, Revised], nine subjects (22%) dis-
played a full affective syndrome, and five (12%) displayed psychotic symptoms
associated with steroid use.
Id. at 487. "All users who experienced psychotic symptoms were 'stacking' between two and
four steroids ...." Id. at 489. "[N]o subject had psychotic symptoms during periods of no
steroid exposure." Id. Although in this study all psychotic symptoms were experienced by
persons who were stacking, it is possible that an anabolic steroid user may experience
psychotic symptoms when using only one drug.
102. Id. A delusion of reference can be defined as a phenomenon where objects, events,
or people are given unrealistic significance-e.g., an individual's belief that comments from
a radio disc jockey are aimed directly at insulting him. A delusion of grandeur is an unreal-
istic belief that one has remarkable special ability, e.g., the ability to run the United Na-
tions, or powers, e.g., the strength to lift a truck.
103. Id. ("Although some studies have noted euphoria or irritability in association
with anabolic steroid use, only four reports, to our knowledge, have described more serious
psychiatric syndromes."); Washington Post, Apr. 2, 1988, at D2, col. 2 (quoting Dr. Pope as
saying: "There is a far higher incidence of psychiatric symptoms attributable to anabolic
steroids than any of us previously thought."). It must be noted, however, that psychotic
symptoms associated with corticosteroids have been well documented. Katz & Pope, supra
note 90, at 43. In contrast to anabolic steroids which are produced synthetically, corticoste-
roids are steroids which are produced naturally by the adrenal cortex. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 328 (5th ed. 1982). See also Lewis & Smith, Steroid-induced Psychiatric Syn-
dromes, 5 J. AFFEcrIvE DISORDERS 319 (1983) (documenting the psychiatric effects of
corticosteroids).
104. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 31, at 1976, 2254-55 (no men-
tion of psychosis in the exhaustive lists of warnings, precautions, and adverse reactions to
Anavar and Winstrol); PATImrr CARz, supra note 22, at 46-47 (recommended doctor's warn-
ings mention nothing about psychosis); Miller, supra note 40, at 18-19 (providing a long list
of "side effects and adverse reactions"; psychosis not among them); Macdougall, supra note
25, at 97-99 (no mention of psychosis in section entitled "Hazards of Steroid Use"); Haupt
& Rovere, supra note 18, at 482-83 (no mention of psychosis in extensive list of "The Side
Effects of Anabolic Steroids"); S. CHINERY, supra note 42, at 59-65 (chapter on side effects
gives an exhaustive rundown, but fails to mention psychosis); T. DONOHOE & N. JOHNSON,
supra note 33, at 61 (extensive rundown on side effects and no mention of psychosis). But
see W. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 68 (mentioning psychotic illness as rarely-seen side effect);
Lamb, supra note 24, at 36 (mentioning "occasional psychotic episodes" as a side effect); D.
DUCHAINE, supra note 18, at 67 (noting that a psychosis has been alleged to potentially
accompany excessive steroid use, but downplaying the significance of such claims). Cf. id. at
[Vol. 7:1
22
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/2
STEROID-INDUCED PSYCHOSIS
This phenomenon, they claim, is mainly the result of research that
has been both unrealistic and ineffective in gauging psychological
effects.'" Although their study, as they concede, suffered from
many of the drawbacks that have limited past research-especially
subjectivity-the results were still significant because the subjects
reported that during periods of non-exposure to steroids they ex-
perienced no psychotic symptoms..10
Some might argue that the current research is inconclusive as
to whether there is a distinction between the well-documented
ability of anabolic steroids to increase aggressiveness and this re-
cently documented psychosis. However, when viewed in terms of
the Model Penal Code's definition of intoxication the two side ef-
fects are clearly distinguishable.0 7 A steroid-induced psychosis
may manifest itself in the form of delusion, auditory hallucination,
or other psychotic behavior, appearing separately or in combina-
tion, during which the afflicted individual is removed from cogni-
tive reality.108 In contrast, aggressiveness, without more, is merely
a state where a subject becomes more virile and forceful. 09 An in-
44 (attributing any psychotic behavior that may accompany steroid use to the megadoses of
testosterone cypionate implemented by some modern athletes).
105. See Pope & Katz, supra note 14, at 490. "The common practice of 'stacking' may
lead to psychiatric effects far beyond those previously recorded in research settings." Id. at
490. See also id. at 488 (Table 1) (comparing the quantity of anabolic steroids ingested in
normal clinical studies to the reported use by the subjects in the present study). The report
also notes that the wariness of athletes to reveal their steroid use has further limited identi-
fication of psychotic symptoms. Id. at 490. Further, it must be noted that these newly re-
ported side effects do not occur in all users. In fact, approximately 75% of those studied
suffered no diagnosable psychiatric disorder at all, further strengthening the argument that
these mental status changes are unforeseeable.
106. See Pope & Katz, supra note 14, at 489.
107. The Model Penal Code has defined intoxication as "a disturbance of mental or
physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(a) (1985). See infra notes 150-154 and accompanying text (discussing
more fully the appropriateness of characterizing an anabolic steroid-induced psychosis as a
form of intoxication).
108.. In fact, "psychosis" is defined by The American Psychiatric Association as:
A major mental disorder of organic or emotional origin in which a person's abil-
ity to think, respond emotionally, remember, communicate, interpret reality, and
behave appropriately is sufficiently impaired so as to interfere grossly with the
capacity to meet the ordinary demands of life. [Psychosis] often [is] character-
ized by regressive behavior, inappropriate mood, diminished impulse control,
and such abnormal mental content as delusions and hallucinations. The term is
applicable to conditions having a wide range of severity and duration.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 114-115 (5th ed. 1980) (em-
phasis in original).
109. "Aggression" has been defined as "a form of behavior which leads to self-asser-
tion; it may arise from innate drives and/or a response to frustration; it may be manifested
by destructive and attacking behavior, by covert attitudes of hostility and obstructionism, or
19891
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crease in "aggressiveness" will not, without more, disturb an indi-
vidual's cognitive capacities. As the definition of intoxication re-
quires a "disturbance" of mental capacities,10 a steroid-induced
psychosis clearly satisfies the requirement, but an increase in ag-
gressiveness does not."'
There is a corollary to the recent study's argument that ster-
oid use carries with it an adverse psychiatric side effect that was
rarely seen by researchers: if psychiatric repercussions have been
unforeseen by researchers and physicians, then they were, and ar-
guably remain to be, unforeseen by the individuals who use the
drugs." 2 Such unassuming use creates a perplexing dilemma for
the law. With the advent of this research noting the psychotic
repercussions of anabolic steroid use, the implications for criminal
responsibility quickly come to the forefront. Psychotic behavior
can become criminal behavior."' When this occurs, it is difficult,
yet necessary, to determine how to apply the theories of criminal
responsibility and the appurtenant theories of excuse. This task is
especially challenging when the psychotic behavior potentially
could occur without the afflicted individual's ever foreseeing it.
by a healthy self expressive drive to mastery." DARLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
40 (26th ed. 1985). Unlike the definition of "psychosis," the definition of "aggression" does
not include a possible removal from cognitive reality.
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(a) (1985). "Disturb" has been defined as "to
interfere with." WEB s R's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 661 (1976). "Mental Ca-
pacity," albeit in a civil context, has been defined as "sufficient mind and memory to under-
stand the nature and effect of the [acti ...." Haile v. Holtzclaw, 400 S.W.2d 603, 612-13
(Tax. Civ. App. 1966). The Haile court seems to articulate the meaning of "mental capacity"
in terms of cognitive ability. Cf. infra note 120 (M'Naghten test for insanity requires a
complete loss of cognitive ability).
111. However, aggressiveness in the context of psychosis may become exaggerated and
seriously dangerous.
112. This statement is of course contingent on the user's not knowingly having exper-
ienced psychotic symptoms in the past. See infra note 242. Further, as the recent study
noting psychiatric symptoms associated with anabolic steroid use has been mentioned in
several popular "iron game" magazines, individuals may have personal knowledge of the
drugs' potential to induce psychiatric side effects. See, e.g., MUSCLEMAG, Oct. 1988, at 22
(reprinting Pope & Katz, Affective and Psychotic Symptoms Associated With Anabolic
Steroid Use, supra note 14); Olin, 'Roid Rage Is Not A Pretty Sight, FLEX, May 1988, at 70
(noting the psychotic symptoms reported by Pope & Katz); Brainum, Anabolic Madness,
MUSCLE & FITNESS, Oct. 1987, at 93 (noting the psychotic symptoms reported by Pope &
Katz); 'Roid 'Noids, MUSCLE & FITNESS, October 1988, at 264 (summarizing the findings
reported by Pope & Katz).
113. See Greenland, Dangerousness, Mental Disorder, and Politics in DANGEROUSNESS
35 (C. Webster, M. Ben-Aron, & S. Hucker ed. 1985) (study documenting typology of violent
offenders indicates that in a high percentage their "violence is usually associated with an
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III. APPLICABLE THEORIES OF ExcusE
The criminal law has recognized a number of qualifications to
otherwise proscribed acts so as to eliminate, or at least mitigate,
the criminal responsibility and moral blameworthiness of certain
individuals. 14 An individual who acts without criminal intent or,
alternatively, without exercising free will, is not morally blamewor-
thy. To punish such a person as if he freely intended his act would
offend the moral norms of a civilized society."1 5 Hence, the law has
created vehicles for eliminating or mitigating criminal responsibil-
ity to eradicate the oppressiveness of punishing those who, al-
though they have acted, did so without either free will or criminal
intent.116 Some of these theories may be relevant to the offender
who claims to have been afflicted with a steroid-induced psycho-
sis."" Consequently, the subsequent analysis will inspect their ap-
plicability to the present issue. As stated earlier, Florida law will
114. See S. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 65 (1987).
115. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The criminal law...
is an expression of the moral sense of the community. The fact that the law has... regarded
certain wrongdoers as. improper subjects for punishment is a testament to the extent to
which that moral sense has developed."); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) ("Our traditions also require that where [illegal] acts stem from and are the prod-
uct of a mental disease or defect ... moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not
be criminal responsibility.") The Supreme Court of the United States also has noted this
basic premise of the criminal law: "Our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of
punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice of doing right
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 250 n.4 (1952) (quoting POUND, INTRODUCTION to SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW
(1927)).
116. See Freeman, 357 F.2d at 625 ("[T]he defense of lack of responsibility is essen-
tially an acknowledgement on the part of society that because of mental disease or defect
certain classes of wrongdoers are not properly the subjects of criminal punishment."). Kad-
ish categorizes criminal defenses -in one of two classes: justification or excuse. S. KADISH,
supra note 114, at 82. Those defenses within the category of justification embody the notion
that the law will allow what a crime as defined otherwise would prohibit where circum-
stances, specified elsewhere in the law, make the proscribed act the right thing to do. Id. at
82. For example, self-defense and the defense of necessity are classified as justification de-
fenses. Those defenses classified under the umbrella of the doctrine of excuse are based on
the notion that a defendant is not blameworthy because some disability affecting his free-
dom to choose right makes it inappropriate to punish him. Id. at 82. Insanity and duress are
classified as excuse defenses.
117. Before moving into a discussion of the applicability of certain criminal law de-
fenses to a steroid-induced psychotic it is necessary to establish one thing: Much of the law
involving the effect of drug use on criminal responsibility naturally is tied up in the general
defense of intoxication. The analysis and discussion that follows all will be made on the
assumption that this steroid-created psychosis is indeed a form of intoxication. See infra
notes 150-154 and accompanying text (arguing that an anabolic steroid-induced psychosis
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provide the backdrop for the inquiry.
A. Insanity
The most well-known of the vehicles for avoiding penal blame
is the insanity defense. "' Among the various forms of the insanity
defense,"' the most common is the M'Naghten rule.120 The State
of Florida has long recognized the famed M'Naghten rule as the
test of legal insanity.' 2 1 There are three essential requirements that
a defendant must meet in order to satisfy M'Naghten. The defend-
ant must have: (1) a mental disease or defect; (2) a defect of reason
causally related to the disease or defect; and (3) a lack of knowl-
118. R. GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1 (1984). Professor Kadish explains why the
law recognizes the insanity defense:
The justification for the [defense] is that it does in fact exclude from liabil-
ity a category of persons who by definition could not be deterred by the prospect
of punishment, simply because they were incapable of choice, and whom in con-
sequence, it would be futile as well as unjust to punish.
S. KADISH, supra note 114, at 67. See also Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 86 (D.C.
1976) ("[Mens real refers to the existence in fact of a guilty mind; insanity, on the other
hand, connotes a presumption that a particular individual lacks the capacity to possess such
a state of mind."), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
119. As the following discussion notes, the "insanity defense" has existed in five gen-
eral forms. However, even jurisdictions which adopt the same general form may differ in
their exact approach. As such, there is no universally recognized "insanity defense." For an
excellent overview of the five forms in which the test of legal insanity appears, see Keilitz,
Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 289 (1987).
120. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2, at 312 (2d ed. 1986) ("The
M'Naghten test has become the predominant rule in the United States."). As originally for-
mulated, the M'Naghten test would relieve a defendant of criminal blame if:
[A]t the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and the quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did
not know what he was doing was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). In Wheeler v. State, 344 So.2d 244
(Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979), the Florida Supreme Court articulated Flor-
ida's version of M'Naughten:
If at the time of an alleged crime a defendant was by reason of mental infirmity,
disease or defect unable to understand the nature and quality of his act or its
consequences or, if he did understand it, was incapable of distinguishing that
which is right from that which is wrong, he was legally insane and should be
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Id. at 246 n.2. For an excellent summary of the case of Daniel M'Naghten, see R. GERBER,
supra note 118, at 21-27 (1984). See also Wingo, Squaring M'Naghten With Precedent-An
Historical Note, 26 S.C.L. REV. 81 (1974) (putting the M'naghten case into historical con-
text); infra note 257 (discussing M'Naghten's requirement that the accused's cognitive im-
pairment be complete).
121. The Florida Supreme Court first declared M'Naghten the rule in Florida in Davis
v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902). The rule has endured. See Comment, Should Florida
Follou The Federal Insanity Defense, 15 FLA. ST. U.L REV. 793, 824 (1987).
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edge about the consequences of his act or its legality or morality. 12
1. Causation
The primary causal query in determining whether a defendant
was insane when he committed a criminal act is whether the un-
lawful conduct he engaged in was the result of a "mental disease or
defect.112 3 However, there is an antecedent legal issue with a ster-
oid-induced psychotic. Before a steroid-induced psychosis can be
considered a "mental disease or defect," an initial inquiry must ask
whether the "mental disease or defect" required to establish in-
sanity may be the product of drug use.
Florida's version of M'Naghten has conformed with the mod-
ern evolution of the rule with respect to causation. Although the
causative element of the loss of reason was at first limited to a
"mental infirmity,"' 24 the test 'was broadened by the Florida Su-
preme Court in Wheeler v. State2 5 to include a "mental infirmity,
disease or defect .... ,,126 This test remains the pertinent inquiry
for causation under Florida law today.12 7 However, there is still no
clear definition of "mental infirmity, disease, or defect in the law of
Florida."' 28 This paucity of guidance in the law leaves one with a
perplexing puzzle when trying to determine whether a drug-
induced psychosis may satisfy the necessary mental infirmi-
ty, disease, or defect that the definitions of insanity, including
M'Naghten, universally require. 29
2. Insanity and Drug Use: Legitimate Partners?
Before a defendant can claim irresponsibility on the grounds
of drug-induced insanity, the insanity tests implicitly require him
first to establish a causal connection between his drug use and the
122. Keilitz, supra note 119, at 294.
123. Id. at 295 (defining the causation requirement as the necessity of establishing
that the unlawful conduct was the product ;f mental irregularity).
124. See Comment, supra note 121, at 826; FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASES § 2.10(b)-i (1970).
125. 344 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979).
126. Id. at 246 n.2 (emphasis added).
127. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(b) (1986).
128. See Comment, supra note 121, at 827.
129. All the definitions of insanity require that the insanity be a product of a "mental
disease or defect." See Special Project, Drugs and Criminal Responsibility, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 1145, 1191 (1980). This requirement stated in terms of the M'Naghten test requires
the defendant to prove that, at the time of the commission of the crime, an underlying
medical disease or defect prevented him from perceiving the nature or the consequences of
his action or from distinguishing right from wrong.
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requisite causative element of insanity, "mental disease or de-
fect.' 13  Defendants have asserted causation in a variety of circum-
stances. Most pertinent here are the occasions where an accused
argued that his insanity was a consequence of a disease or defect
resulting from either long term drug or alcohol use or, alterna-
tively, from gross, albeit temporary, intoxication.'
3. Delirium Tremens
Insanity has been recognized in some instances where the ac-
tual causative factor of the state of mind was the actor's use of
drugs or alcohol. 3 2 Long term drug or alcohol use is allowable as a
causative factor of a "disease or defect" when the end result is a
state known as delirium tremens. 33 In the eyes of the law, delirium
tremens is the end product of long continued intoxication and
equates to legal insanity;'" however, it is critical to realize that a
state of delirium tremens is present only after the effects of the
intoxicant have worn off.'35 It is imperative to distinguish this
130. See Special Project, supra note 129, at 1191-92.
131. "The effect of drug ... addiction on mens rea has led a number of courts and
commentators to raise the issue of [its] relation to criminal responsibility." Id. at 1190.
However, addiction alone would not be sufficient to establish insanity. United States v. Ly-
ons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir.) (en banc) ("Today the great weight of legal authority
clearly supports the view that evidence of mere narcotics addiction, standing alone and
without other physiological or psychological involvement, raises no issue of such a mental
defect or disease as can serve as a basis for the insanity defense."), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
930 (1984); Bennett, Drug Addiction And Its Effect On Criminal Responsibility, 9 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 179, 184 (1973). But, if the nexus between the dependence and a resulting
disease or defect could be established, the possibility of using addiction to establish insanity
would exist. See Special Project, supra note 129, at 1191-92. The opportunity to make this
argument would prove advantageous to the steroid abuser who could establish a disease or
defect which was the result of dependence. However, because the research alluding to a
dependency is still in an embryionic stage, the claim at this point in time is tenuous. See
Taylor, supra note 32, at 142-143. For that reason, and because of the infinite number of
issues such an analysis would raise, a discussion of anabolic steroid addiction as a link to
insanity is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Annotation, Drug Addiction or
Related Mental State as Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 16 (1976).
132. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120, §4.10(g), at 395.
133. See Cochran v. State, 65 Fla. 91, 98-99, 61 So. 187, 190 (1913). See also AMEaCAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 131
(3d ed. rev. 1987) (describing the effects of delirium tremens as: "Vivid hallucinations,
which may be visual, auditory, or tactile .. "). See also Note, Intoxication as A Criminal
Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1210, 1219 n.66 (1955) (providing an outstanding description of
delirium tremens).
134. Delirium tremens "can result in the inability to realize the quality of one's act or
inability to distinguish right from wrong." Boettcher, Voluntary Intoxication: A Defense To
Specific Intent Crimes, 65 U. DEr L. REv. 33, 35 (1987).
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state from "those situations in which the mental impairment does
not extend beyond the period of intoxication."1 36
Delirium tremens is recognized as a defense under Florida
law.1 1 The Florida Supreme Court in Cirack v. State defined it as:
"insanity superinduced by the long and continued use of intoxi-
cants so as to produce a fixed and settled frenzy or insanity either
permanent or intermittent."'13 At first glance, a steroid-induced
psychosis appears to fall within the scope of this mental state.
However, upon closer inspection, a steroid-induced psychosis lacks
an element necessary to establish delirium tremens.
Although the two states are similar in that both are brought
on by long term use of alcohol or drugs, the similarities stop there.
Research has shown that when the afflicted steroid user stops using
the drug his mental status returns to normal, either immediately
or within a short time. 39 In contrast, the definition of delirium
tremens would require that the mind remain affected well after the
drug use has terminated.140 Further, delirium tremens, as defined
by the law, is present only in the absence of the intoxicating influ-
ence of the agent.14 ' A steroid-induced psychosis, in contrast, is
present only when the afflicted person actually is using steroids,
and for a short time following cessation of use. Thus, unlike delir-
ium tremens, the close temporal presence of the drug is essential to
the existence of a steroid-induced psychosis. The psychosis is by
nature a purely temporary state, only present during and shortly
after the drug has been used. Consequently, a steroid-induced psy-
chosis is not "fixed and settled.' ' 4 2 Thus, because the condition
136. Id. at 575, 516 P.2d at 882, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
137. E.g., Cochran v. State, 65 Fla. 91, 61 So. 187 (1913); Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113,
9 So. 835 (1891). See also Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967); Britts v. State, 158 Fla.
839, 30 So.2d 363 (1947), overruled on other grounds in 73 So.2d 862 (1959); Crews v. State, '
143 Fla. 263, 196 So. 590 (1940);Hall v. State,.78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919).
138. Cirack, 201 So.2d at 709. See also Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939, 944 (Fla. 1984)
(qualifying the "fixed and settled" test from Cirack by noting that "when a single instance
or episode of voluntary intoxication impairs a defendant's judgment and ability to distin-
guish between right and wrong it will not support the complete defense of insanity.") (em-
phasis in original).
139. See Deposition of Dr. David L. Katz, M.D. at 39-40, State v. Horace Williams,
No. 86-9257 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. taken May-9, 1988).
140. See Boettcher, supra note 134, at 35-36. Cf. Cochran v. State, 61 So. at 190 ([De-
lirium tremens] is "not produced by the immediate effects of [intoxicants].").
141. See Boettcher, supra note 134, at 36 ("Evidence of intoxication -will be fatal to [a
delirium tremens] claim.").
142. The requirement that a state of delirium tremens be "fixed and settled" seems to
connote a sense of permanency. The allusion to "intermittent" in the second portion of the
Cirack court's definition should not fool the unwary. The condition itself is fixed or settled;
however, the effects of the condition can be either permanent or intermittent.
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produced is not permanent, a steroid-induced psychosis would not
constitute legally recognized insanity resulting from long term drug
use.
4. Temporary Insanity
Because a steroid-induced psychosis is not "fixed and settled,"
the inquiry must turn to whether this psychosis, temporary as it
may be, still might warrant exculpation on the grounds of tempo-
rary insanity.1, 3 Again the inquiry turns on the indispensable, in-
corporated question of causation: can temporary intoxication from
drug use provide the "mental disease or defect" universally re-
quired to warrant exculpation on the grounds of insanity?
The logical response to the inquiry is that a temporary, delu-
sional state created by "voluntary" use of drugs is not the type of
causative factor that is implicit within the phrase "mental infir-
mity, disease or defect.' 4 4 Indeed, the rule in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, Florida included, is that temporary in-
sanity which would free the accused from criminal responsibility
cannot be the result of alcohol or drug use. 145 A temporary state of
143. Assuming, arguendo, that the mental state which is the product of a steroid-in-
duced psychosis is indeed the equivalent of legal insanity, then the only critical issue will be
causation.
144. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10(g), at 395. "Voluntary" is
necessarily defined here as an uncoerced physical act, the consequences of which are foresee-
able by the actor. Some courts have claimed that recognizing as an exculpatory factor an
individual's voluntary creation of a disease or defect by drug use would violate public policy.
See infra note 147 and accompanying text; State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358, 369, 209 A.2d 117,
122 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993, reh'g denied, 383 U.S. 922 (1966).
145. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 54, at 171-72 (1981) ("Temporary insanity which
arises from present voluntary intoxication is no defense to a criminal charge. This is true
even though the defendant's temporary state of mind may meet the requirements of legal
insanity .. "); State, Attorney For Twentieth Circuit v. McNally, 336 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla.
2d DCA 1976) (Florida law's test for the recognition of insanity as a result of voluntary
intoxication "contemplates a mental disease or disorder which manifests itself intermit-
tently or permanently irrespective of consumption of [intoxicant]."). See also State v. Hall,
214 N.W.2d 205, 207-208 (Iowa 1974) (affirming the trial court's refusal of an insanity in-
struction which would have included temporary insanity induced by drugs); Evans v. State,
645 P.2d 155, 160 (Alaska 1982) (adopting the standard that the accused's intoxicated state
is irrelevant to the issue of insanity). Nonetheless, some courts have found that a temporary
state of mind, equivalent to legal insanity, may indeed exculpate an accused, despite the
fact that the state was created by the self-administration of drugs or alcohol. See Annota-
tion, Effect of Voluntary Drug Intoxication Upon Criminal Responsibility, 73 A.L.R.3d 98,
130 (1976). Cf. State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715, 722 (1972) (holding that a psychosis
met the test of insanity even though it was voluntarily caused by drug use). At least one
court has reasoned that the cause of such a state is irrelevant. See, e.g., id. at 722 ("We
think it compatible with the philosophical basis of M'Naghten to accept the fact of a schizo-
phrenic episode without inquiry into its etiology.").
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intoxication cannot provide the type of "disease or defect" that
would warrant criminal exculpation via the insanity defense.""
Most courts and commentators have reasoned that to include such
a state of mind within the definition of insanity would throw open
a window of opportunity through which the voluntarily intoxicated
offender could escape, casting a pall over public safety. The prece-
dent set would encourage recklessness as individuals would be free
to ingest intoxicants knowing that, if they do so to the point of
temporarily eliminating their cognitive capacity, they will be com-
pletely free from the force of the law. Public policy would prohibit
such a result.'
4 7
Any defect, disease, or infirmity that casts itself in the form of
a steroid-induced psychosis is still likely to be the product of self-
administered drug use. Therefore, a steroid-induced psychotic's
use of the insanity defense would be foreclosed even before any
issue of the degree of cognitive impairment is reached.
1 48
146. H. FINGARETrE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
112 (1979). See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 120, §4.10, at 388 ("[One is not] insane
just because he is intoxicated, for insanity requires a 'disease of the mind' .... ."). See, e.g.,
People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 406, 447 N.E.2d 218, 231 (holding that a toxic psychosis
prompted by the voluntary ingestion of alcohol and drugs does not constitute mental disease
or defect), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110, 197 N.W.2d
813 (1972) ("We do not consider that a voluntarily drugged condition is a form of insanity
which under the American Law Institute test of insanity can constitute a mental defect or
disease."); State v. Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492, 503, 267 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1978) ("[W]e
are not willing to hold in this case that a temporary psychotic state which lasts only for the
period of intoxication and which is brought into existence by ...voluntary intoxication
constitutes a mental disease ...."). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(3) (1985) ("Intoxication
does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of Section 4.01.").
147. See Linehan v. State, 442 So.2d 244, 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) ("[A) purpose of
criminal law is to protect society from behavior that endangers the public safety .... That
purpose and the deterrent objectives of criminal law may be subverted by relieving a person
from the consequences of his own conduct.), aff'd as to result, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1985); H.
FINGARETrE & A. HASSE, supra note 146, at 111-112. But see infra note 157 (arguing that
public policy is not violated fully by the criminal law's recognition of the defense of volun-
tary intoxication because a successful use of that defense, see infra note 167, unlike a suc-
cessful insanity defense, most likely will not result in complete exculpation).
148. This result seems inconsistent. Why will the law recognize insanity brought on by
long term drug use but* not that which results from a tempor ay bout? The law seems to
reason that by recognizing intoxicant-induced insanity only when it is a settled condition
brought on by years of using the substance the risk of an individual feigning intoxication
and escaping punishment will be reduced. See Note, supra note 133, at 1221 ("[Bly requir-
ing a long period of excessive drinking with recognizable syndromes, a degree of objective
evidential corroboration is attained which reduces the possibility of fraud which may be
present in ordinary cases of intoxication."). But Cf. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW 531 (2d ed. 1960) (claiming that any argument that drunkenness can be feigned to
the degree of avoiding penal blame is absurd).
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B. Voluntary Intoxication
This Article has concluded that a steroid-induced psychosis
-even if it satisfies the cognitive test of insanity-fails as a
method of completely eliminating culpability under the insanity
defense because, in essence, it would be a temporary insanity cre-
ated by the voluntary, excessive use of a drug. However, because
anabolic steroids are taken voluntarily and induce changes in
mental status, consideration of the applicability of the defense of
voluntary intoxication is appropriate. " 9
1. Intoxication?
In analyzing the etiology and nature of a steroid-induced psy-
chosis to determine whether the criteria necessary to establish an
intoxication defense are present, the threshold question would of
course be whether such a psychosis is "intoxication" at all. Because
Florida has no applicable statute, the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, discussed above, provides an adequate defini-
tion. 50 Section 2.08(5)(a) of the Model Penal Code specifically de-
fines "intoxication" as "a disturbance of mental or physical capaci-
ties resulting from the introduction of substances into the
body.""' In light of the recent research findings, a steroid-induced
psychosis surely would meet this standard."2' Anabolic steroids are
introduced into the body and, when done so in large doses, the
recent research indicates that they may disturb the mental capaci-
ties. "3 In the terms of this definition, then, a steroid-induced psy-
chosis would constitute "intoxication."
1
15
149. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10, at 387-88. See generally Singh,
History of The Defense Of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law, 49 L.Q. Rv. 528, 530
(1933); Hall, Intoxication And Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. Rsv. 1045 (1944); Paul-
sen, Intoxication As A Defense To Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Note, supra note 133. One
commentator aptly sums up this area of the law: "A scholar in search of logic, consistency
and clarity of expression in the law would do well to look elsewhere than in the cases involv-
ing intoxication as a defense." Smith, Intoxication As A Defense To A Criminal Charge In
Pennsylvania, 76 DIcK. L. REv. 15, 16 (1971).
150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(a) (1985). "The great majority of states ... have
included drugs within the intoxication provision." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment at
366 (1985).
151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985). The explanatory note to section 2.08 asserts
that this broad definition is not to be limited to the effects of alcohol or narcotics. Id. ex-
planatory note at 350.
152. See Pope & Katz, supra note 14.
153. See supra notes 101-111 and accompanying text.
154. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(30) (1989) (defining an intoxicating sub-
stance as "any controlled substance ... and any alcoholic beverage .... ). Were a statute
similar to Montana's applicable in a state that did not include anabolic steroids within their
(Vol. 7:1
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2. Evidence of Intoxication and Criminal Intent: A Conundrum
for the Law
Voluntarily created intoxication will relieve a person of crimi-
nal responsibility for a specific intent crime"' 6 if the intoxication
rendered that person incapable of forming15 the specific intent
constituting an element of the crime.""7 This rule is accepted in
schedule of controlled substances, steroids would not, by definition, be an intoxicating
substance.
155. Specific intent is, in general terms, some intent beyond the mere intent to per-
form the physical act required for the crime. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120, § 4.10,
at 389 n.18 ('Thus burglary requires an intent to commit a felony within the building in
addition to the intent to break and enter the building; larceny an intent to steal the prop-
erty in addition to the intent to take and carry away the property."); Special Project, supra
note 129, at 1175 n.318 ("Specific intent is the intent to commit a particular act with a
specific objective in mind which constitutes the harm defined by the law.") (quoting M.
BAsslouNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 178 (1978)). Chief Justice Traynor of the Supreme
Court of California has defined specific intent as the "intent to do some further act or
achieve some additional consequence" beyond the intent to perform the proscribed act. Peo-
ple v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 457, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1969). "A crime
may be labeled as a 'specific intent' crime either by legislative prescription or through com-
mon law interpretation." Boettcher, supra note 134, at 34. See generally H. FINGARETTE &
A. HASSE, supra note 146, at 77-104 (summarizing the history of the specific intent/general
intent distinction).
156. American jurisdictions take three approaches to the admissibility of evidence of
intoxication. Nearly half the states will admit evidence of voluntary intoxication whenever it
is relevant to the particular specific intent as defined by the crime. P. Low, CRIMINAL LAW
139 (1984) (West Black Letter Series). Many states, again nearly half, only will admit evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication if counsel offers it to show that the defendant was incapable
of forming the specific intent required to establish a particular crime. Id. In a few states,
evidence of voluntary intoxication is wholly inadmissible to show the lack of specific intent.
Id. Florida apparently follows the rule that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible
only to show that the defendant was incapable of forming a requisite specific intent. E.g.,
Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1985) ("We emphasize that voluntary intoxica-
tion is an affirmative defense and that the defendant must come forward with evidence of
intoxication at the time of the offense sufficient to establish that he was unable to form the
intent necessary to commit the crime charged.") (emphasis added); Gentry v. State, 437
So.2d 1097 (Fla. 1983) ("In this instance voluntary intoxication could only be used to show
that the intoxication was so extensive as to suspend the power of reasoning, rendering the
appellant incapable of entertaining the requisite specific intent.") (emphasis added); Gar-
ner v. State 28 Fla. 113, 153-54, 9 So. 835, 845 (Fla. 1891) ("Whenever ... a specific or
particular intent is an essential or constituent' element of the offense, intoxication, though
voluntary, becomes a matter for consideration, or is relevant evidence, with reference to the
capacity or ability of the accused to form or entertain the particular intent .... ") (empha-
sis added).
157. See Special Project, supra note 129, at 1173. But see J. HALL, supra note 148, at
533-34 (noting that some courts ignore the rule in cases that "outrage public sensibilities").
See supra note 155 for a definition of specific intent. It is important to "note that evidence
of alcohol consumption prior to the commission of a crime does not, by itself, mandate the
giving of jury instructions with regard to voluntary intoxication." Linehan, 476 So.2d at
1264. Moreover, voluntary intoxication does not of itself prove absence of intent. Leon v.
State, 186 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). The issue is always a factual one: was the intoxica-
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most jurisdictions, including Florida.15 8
With respect to most crimes, the state must prove that the
defendant intended to commit the crime with which he is
charged. " 9 The requisite intent of a crime is known as the mens
rea.1s0 Defense counsel introduces evidence of voluntary intoxica-
tion to show that the defendant was incapable of possessing the
mens rea that is an indispensable element of the crime."' If this
effort is successful, a necessary element of proof has failed and the
law considers that the crime was not committed."" However, vol-
untary intoxication will not shield a defendant from criminal re-
sponsibility in all circumstances. While some crimes require proof
of a specific intent,6 3 other crimes require only a showing of a gen-
eral intent. 1 4 The proof of voluntarily incurred intoxication will
tion far reaching enough to deprive the accused of the ability to form the requisite intent?
This Article previously asserted that public policy would preclude individuals from freeing
themselves of criminal responsibility by becoming intoxicated. See supra note 147 and ac-
companying text. Logically extended, this policy would preclude reliance on any defense
involving voluntary intoxication. This Article, however, will not debate the policy implica-
tions of the law recognizing the voluntary intoxication defense. It will suffice to say that
public policy is not violated fully with the defense of voluntary intoxication because a suc-
cessful use of that defense, unlike a successful insanity defense, most likely will not result in
complete exculpation.
158. Annotation, Modern Status Of The Rules As To Voluntary Intoxication As De-
fense To Criminal Charge, 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1240 (1966) ("Apparently no court has ever
dissented from the proposition, and it is embodied in the statutes in some jurisdictions.");
Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967). However, it seems some jurisdictions do not fol-
low the rule. See, e.g., McDaniel v. State, 356 So.2d 1151 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially
concurring); State v. Jordan, 285 Mo. 62, 225 S.W. 905 (Mo. 1920). See generally J. HALL,
supra note 148, 529-557 (discussing the voluntary intoxication defense).
159. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, §3.4, at 212.
160. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
161. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10(a), at 389.
162. See Special Project, supra note 129, at 1174 n.304 (citing Commonwealth v.
Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975)). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 120,
§ 4.10(a), at 388 n.7 ("This is so even if an applicable statute provides that voluntary intoxi-
cation is no excuse for crime, since intoxication which negatives an element is not excusing a
crime which has been committed but rather negating the commission of the crime."). It
must be noted that if the defendant becomes voluntarily intoxicated for the purpose of
carrying out the crime, the intoxication will have no effect on his ultimate culpability and
the defendant will be punished to the full extent of the law. See Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113,
9 So. 835 (1891).
163. See supra notes 155-57 for a definition and discussion of specific intent.
164. General intent is merely the intent to do the physical act which the crime pros-
cribes. W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'r, supra note 120, § 4.10(a), at 389-90. Cf. People v. Hood, 1
Cal. 3d 444, 456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1969) (Traynor, C.J.) ("When
the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without refer-
ence to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the
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only negate a specific intent element of a crime.165 It will not ne-
gate the general intent component, as mere proof of the commis-
sion of the proscribed act, actus reus, will be sufficient to show the
accused possessed general intent, regardless of his intoxicated
state. ' " Because of this phenomenon, mitigation, as opposed to
complete exculpation, will be the result. 1
7
165. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10(a), at 389. See supra notes 155-57
'for a definition and discussion of specific intent.
166. W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 120, § 4.10(a), at 389-90. See supra note 164
for a definition of general intent. To establish the general intent element of a crime the
prosecution only need prove actus reus-the proscribed act. The criminal intent is imputed
from the perfomance of that proscribed act. Note, supra note 133, at 1212. General intent is
not negated by proof of voluntary intoxication. This phenomenon occurs because nearly all
acts which are defined as criminal consist of at least a general intent component. See
Boettcher, supra note 134, at 34. As voluntary intoxication only negates specific intent, the
general intent always will endure because it is imputed from the defendant's act. By merely
performing a proscribed act a person will be considered to have formed general intent, de-
spite his being intoxicated. As a result, an individual who commits a proscribed act while
voluntarily intoxicated never will be exculpated completely; even if he is secure from convic-
tion of a specific intent crime, if proven to have committed a proscribed act, he always can
be convicted of a general intent crime. See also People v. Tocco, 138 Misc.2d 510, 513-14,
525 N.Y.S.2d 137, 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) ("Crimes in which the requisite mens rea is one
of recklessness are classified as 'general intent' crimes .... [T]he majority of cases in the
United States create a special rule relating to intoxication, thereby not allowing an intoxi-
cated individual to avail himself of the defense in crimes of recklessness."). Cf. MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985) ("When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the
actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been
aware had he been sober, such awareness is immaterial.").
As one already may have surmised, specific and general intent have been extremely
difficult concepts to define and apply. In fact, at least one Justice of the Florida Supreme
Court has announced a willingness to abandon the specific intent/general intent distinction.
See Chestnut v. State, 538 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla. 1989) (Shaw, J., specially concurring) ("I
write only to note again that the nebulous distinction between general and specific intent
crimes and the defense of voluntary intoxication bear reexamination in a suitable case.").
167. "Mitigation" as used here would refer to the phenomenon which is a product of
the specific intent/general intent distinction. As this Article has pointed out, intoxication
may preclude conviction for a specific intent crime. However, included within the elements
of a specific intent crime are the elements of a lesser included offense which may require the
state to prove a mere general intent. See Scurry v. State, 521 So.2d 1077, 1079 (Fla. 1988)
(Grimes-, J., dissenting) ("A necessarily lesser included offense is an essential aspect of the
greater offense. It is legally impossible to prove the greater offense without at the same time
proving the lesser offense."). If that is the case, the intoxication will not be a defense to the
formation of the general intent. However, as a general intent, lesser included offense nor-
mally possesses a lesser degree of culpability, the punishment for committing the lesser in-
cluded offense is potentially less than if the specific intent crime were charged and proved.
Therefore, mitigation results. In essence, proof of intoxication affects the crime of which the
person is convicted and, in so doing, may lessen punishment. See Special Project, supra
note 129, at 1175; supra note 155 and accompanying text. For example,.a defendant may be
charged with first degree premeditated murder, a specific intent crime. He may offer evi-
dence of intoxication to show that he was incapable of forming the requisite specific in-
tent-i.e., premeditated intent to kill. If the intoxication defense is successful in negating
the specific intent required by the first degree murder statute, the defendant is still suscep-
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3. Specific Intent and the Steroid-Induced Psychotic
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized the voluntary in-
toxication defense.168 As a result, the defense would be a relevant
consideration for counsel searching to find a mitigating theory for
the steroid-induced psychotic charged with a specific intent
crime.1 6' If the defendant introduces evidence which adequately
shows this psychosis to be a form of intoxication,170 the theory
would allow the jury to consider whether the condition precluded
the defendant from forming the intent required as an element of
the crime. 71 If the jury does find that the defendant was incapable
of forming a specific intent because of the intoxicated condition,
the likely result would be mitigation; the defendant would be con-
victed, if at all, only of a crime requiring proof of a mere general
intent.
If the law is going to recognize the voluntary intoxication de-
fense, a court's admission of evidence of a steroid-induced psycho-
sis to establish the defense is logical and equitable. Indeed, the vol-
untary intoxication defense applies to drunkenness-a state which
would include many conditions far from a complete loss of ration-
ality.172 Thus, if a jury could find that a person inebriated at the
tible of conviction for second degree murder, a lesser included offense to first degree murder
and, in Florida, a general intent crime. See Gentry v. State, 437 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1983)
(noting that a conviction for second degree murder in Florida requires only a general in-
tent). As second degree murder is a general intent crime, evidence of voluntary intoxication
will not negate the requisite general intent. Thus, a successful voluntary intoxication de-
fense may allow a defendant to escape conviction for the specific intent crime of first degree
murder, but still allow conviction on the lesser included offense of second degree murder.
Because a conviction for second degree murder would result in less punishment than a con-
viction for first degree murder, the obvious result of a successful voluntary intoxication de-
fense would be mitigation.
168. See, e.g., Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1985); Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d
706 (Fla. 1967); Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891).
169. A steroid-induced psychotic charged with first degree felony murder also could
use the defense if the underlying felony with which he was charged was a specific intent
crime. See Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1985). For example, Horace Williams,
charged with robbery and first degree murder, asserted the defense of voluntary intoxica-
tion. Transcript at 2733, State v. Williams, No. 86-9275 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct., June 10,
1987).
170. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as To Whether
Accused Had Specific Intent Necessary For Conviction, 16 A.L.R.4th 666 (1982).
172. See Special Project, supra note 129, at 1149-51 (describing the effects of alcohol
on the mind). The commentators are careful to point out that the intoxicant need not
render the defendant unconscious or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in order
to render him incapable of forming specific intent. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra
note 120, § 4.10(a), at 391.
173. The issue of whether the accused is so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming
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hands of alcohol was incapable of forming the requisite specific in-
tent, it certainly follows that it could find that an accused afflicted
with the type of psychosis which recently has been attributed to
steroid use similarly could be unable to form specific intent.
The choice to rely on a voluntary intoxication defense brings
with it both advantage and limitation.14 Advantageously, the de-
fendant who chooses to rely on the voluntary intoxication defense
need only introduce enough evidence of intoxication so that the
jury is left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant
was capable of forming the specific intent; the prosecution retains
the burden of persuasion, and must overcome the evidence of in-
toxication to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
in fact formed the requisite intent.'7 " Moreover, the defendant's
voluntary ingestion of the intoxicant is irrelevant.
The primary limitation inherent in the use of the voluntary
the requisite intent is a question of fact. Link v. State, 429 So.2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983);
Jenkins v. State, 58 Fla. 62, 50 So. 582 (1909).
174. In order to raise the defense of intoxication the defendant first must plead not
guilty. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 120, § 4.10(i), at 398. At trial the defendant must
introduce evidence of intoxication, as well as evidence that the intoxication rendered the
defendant unable to form the specific intent. Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla.
1985). See also infra note 175 (discussing the constitutional implications of the assignment
of the burden of proof with respect to intoxication). The defense attorney also would have
to request a jury instruction similar to that found in the FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(g) (1987). Section 3.04 provides in pertinent part:
The use of [alcohol] [drugs] to the extent that it merely arouses passions,
diminishes perceptions, releases inhibitions or clouds reason and judgment does
not excuse the commission of a criminal act.
However, where a certain mental state is an essential element of a crime,
and a person was so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming that mental
state, the mental state would not exist and therefore the crime could not be
committed.*
As I have told you, [the intent to (specific intent charged)] [premeditated
design to kill] [(other mental state)] is an essential element of the crime of
(crime charged).
Therefore, if you find from the evidence that the defendant was so intoxi-
cated from the voluntary use of [alcohol] [drugs) as to be incapable of forming
[the intent to (specific intent charged)] [premediated design to kill] . . . or you
have a reasonable doubt about it, you should find the defendant not guilty of
(crime charged).
Id.
175. The burden of producing evidence of intoxication is on the defendant, but where
the intoxication is offered not as an affirmative defense but rather to negative an element of
the crime, then the burden of persuasion constitutionally cannot be placed on the defend-
ant. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
The state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime charged-intent included. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The evi-
dence of intoxication merely goes to rebut the presence of intent. State v. Schulz, 102 Wis.
2d 423, 429-30, 307 N.W.2d 151, 156 (1981).
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intoxication defense lies in its applicability only to specific intent
crimes. Its inability to render an individual incapable of forming
general intent usually will prevent the defense from completely ex-
culpating a defendant.
Nonetheless, where the facts so warrant, counsel defending a
steroid-induced psychotic charged with a specific intent crime
should consider asserting the defense of voluntary intoxication.
Further, prosecutors and the bench should be aware that evidence
of such a psychosis may be sufficient to negate the specific intent
element of a crime.
4. Is It Always Voluntary?
The basis for the law's refusal to recognize the complete excul-
pation of a voluntarily intoxicated offender is the principle that he
who voluntarily uses intoxicants and subsequently commits a
crime shall not go completely unpunished. 17 Public policy is com-
promised if a person charged with a violent crime marches off scot-
free solely because he willingly became intoxicated by his own
hand; however, public policy is not compromised if an individual
who was not willingly intoxicated remains unpunished for crimes
he committed during the period of intoxication. One must ask,
then, whether the intoxication is willing when the intoxicants in
question are anabolic steroids and the intoxication is an unforeseen
psychosis. Is it true that individuals ingest anabolic steroids know-
ing of the drugs' ability to produce an intoxicating effect and with
the attainment of that effect as the self-evident goal of their inges-
tion? If the answer to this compound question is no, and this Arti-
cle asserts that in many cases it is, then the propriety of generi-
cally characterizing the intoxication attributed to anabolic steroids
as voluntary is questionable.17 Indeed, in light of the realities of
176. The criminal law, in recognizing that voluntary intoxication is a defense to spe-
cific intent crimes, has implemented a mitigating mechanism which inherently recognizes
that an intoxicated offender is not as culpable as one who is sober; at the same time, in
holding that voluntary intoxication will not negate a general intent, the law has attempted
to stand fast to the principle that one who commits a crime after knowingly ingesting intoxi-
cants should not be completely exculpated. See J. HALL. supra note 148, at 537. Cf. State v.
Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 214, 287 A.2d 715, 720-21 (1972) (noting that the policy behind the gen-
eral rule that voluntary intoxication in and of itself will not completely excuse criminal
conduct "restis] upon public policy, demanding that he who seeks the influence of liquor or
narcotics should not be insulated from criminal liability because that influence impaired his
judgment or his control. The required element of badness can be found in the intentional
use of the stimulant or depressant.").
177. The concept of "voluntary" should entail more than just the mechanical perform-
ance of an act. Rather, it should connote a mechanical act which is accompanied by a sense
[Vol. 7:1
38
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/2
STEROID-INDUCED PSYCHOSIS
modern steroid use and the recency of the documentation of the
potential psychiatric repercussions that may accompany it, it is
plausible that an individual who has become intoxicated by using
anabolic steroids may have done so involuntarily. Consequently, a
steroid-induced psychosis may have to be addressed in many cases
not as voluntary intoxication but as involuntary intoxication.
C. Involuntary Intoxication
In contrast to the defense of voluntary intoxication, involun-
tary intoxication is a complete defense to a crime in a M'Naghten
jurisdiction.7M Having its origin in the common law, the defense of
involuntary intoxication serves as a complete shield for the ac-
cused, whether he is charged with a general or a specific intent
crime.17 The defense requires a defendant to prove three ele-
ments: (1) that the defendant was indeed intoxicated; (2) that the
intoxication was involuntarily created; and (3) that as a result of
this involuntary intoxication the defendant's mental state met the
jurisdiction's test for insanity. 80
Although the defense of involuntary intoxication is recognized
in many states by statute, 81 Florida has neither recognized, nor
rejected, the defense in either statute or judicial opinion. 182 For
of awareness on the part of the actor as to the full implications of the act. See State v. Hall,
214 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Iowa 1974) (LeGrand, J., dissenting). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.08(5)(b) (1985) (defining "self-induced" intoxication as "intoxication caused by substances
which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxica-
tion he knows or ought to know ....").
178. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOr, supra note 120, § 4.10(0, at 393-94. See Hendershott v.
People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) ("Involuntary intoxication is without moral culpability
and, for this reason, is a complete defense to all crimes."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225
(1983). However, the defense is rarely used. In fact, "a survey of the cases involving the
voluntary intoxication defense indicates that the possibility of using an involuntary intoxi-
cation defense seems to have been frequently ignored, even though the elements for the
defense were present." Annotation, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary So As To Con-
stitute A Defense To A Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195, 203-204 (1976) (emphasis
added).
179. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10(f), at 393-94.
180. See generally id. at 393-94.
181. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-704 (Harrison 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-804(3)
(1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 423 (1987). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (defining
"self-induced intoxication"). The Model Penal Code, although it does not use the term,
clearly adheres to the common law approach to the involuntary intoxication defense. Specif-
ically, section 2.08(4) provides that intoxication which is not self-induced is an affirmative
defense when the defendant can establish that his state of mind would have constituted
legal insanity were it the product of a mental disease or defect. Id.
182. But see Crusoe v. State, 239 So.2d 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (suggesting in dicta
that drunkenness, be it voluntary or involuntary, doesn't necessarily exculpate); State, At-
torney For Twentieth Circuit v. McNally, 336 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (dicta) (court
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this reason, Florida is a perfect laboratory for analyzing whether a
steroid-induced psychosis may indeed be a form of involuntary
intoxication. 183
1. Involuntary?
As this Article already has concluded that a steroid-induced
psychosis is a form of intoxication,8 4 the next inquiry necessarily
inspects the involuntariness of this intoxication. Again, because
there is no statute or court decision binding a Florida court, a tri-
bunal would be free to proceed under the common law principles,
looking to see whether the situation at hand resembles any of the
circumstances in which the common law traditionally has consid-
ered intoxication to be "involuntary."
The common law has recognized intoxication that results from
alcohol or drugs as involuntary when any of four conditions was
met: (1) the intoxication was coerced or the result of duress; 8" (2)
the intoxication was pathological;' (3) the intoxication resulted
from a substance taken pursuant to a physician's advice;' 87 or, (4)
the intoxication was the result of an innocent mistake by the ac-
cused as to the intoxicating nature of the substance ingested.'8 8 In
order to render the intoxication involuntary the defendant will
have to show that the facts surrounding his affliction with the ster-
oid-induced psychosis parallel one of these four scenarios. How-
ever, such a task is not easy to do.'
rejects involuntariness defense asserted on the basis of addiction; court, also in dicta, specu-
lates that the only time intoxication could be truly involuntary is when it occurs by "Force
Majeure"). Cf. Powers v. State, 369 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So.2d
769 (Fla. 1980) (Although the defendant argued she was temporarily insane at the time of
the commission of the offense by reason of involuntary intoxication, the court affirmed the
conviction without addressing the issue of whether the defense of involuntary intoxication is
recognized in the common law of Florida.).
183. Unbound by a statute or a court decision, a Florida tribunal would be free to
proceed with its analysis, looking to see whether the present situation fits into any of the
scenarios in which the common law recognized intoxication as involuntary. See Wilson v.
Renfroe, 91 So.2d 857, 859 (Fla. 1956) ("In the absence of statute, the common law contin-
ues to be in force ...."); Brooks v. City of West Miami, 246 So.2d 115, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA)
("The common law is in effect except as it is modified or superseded by statute."), cert.
denied, 249 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1971); State v. Hupf, 48 Del. 254, 257, 101 A.2d 355, 356 (Del.
1953) ("Since our statute .. .contains no definiticn, we must look to common-law
principles.").
184. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 202-216 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 217-228 and accompanying text.
189. See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 472, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858
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The common law recognized that intoxication which was co-
erced or the result of duress was involuntary.190 However, the
courts that have discussed duress or coercion as a causative factor
of involuntary intoxication, most of them in dicta, have been very
restrictive in their application of the concept."' Some have gone so
far as to say that a defendant's intoxication will not be considered
involuntary'as a result of duress or coercion unless the defendant
was physically forced to ingest the intoxicant.' 92
Save an extraordinary circumstance, a steroid-induced psycho-
sis clearly is not the product of an outside force. The individual
who ingests anabolic steroids normally administers the drug by
means of his own physical act, either by injection or ingesting the
steroid orally."93 Where the drug is administered by another per-
son, for instance when the user is unable to inject himself,'" it
(Minn. 1976) (en banc) ("Involuntary intoxication ... is a most unusual condition. The
circumstances in which an instruction on the defense of involuntary intoxication will be
appropriate will accordingly be vary rare."). Although some courts and commentators have
claimed that involuntary intoxication is a rare, if not impossible, occurrence, it is important
to note that this conclusion is based on the record of the appellate courts. If the trier of fact
in a given case determined that intoxication was involuntary and, as a consequence, the
defendant was acquitted, there would have been no appeal and no appellate record. See A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 63-64 (1967) (arguing this point in response to those who
claim that the occurrences for a successful insanity defense have been rare).190. Using the definition in section 2.09(1) of the Model Penal Code, an individual's
ingestion of an intoxicant can be considered to have been the result of duress where he was
"coerced to [ingest) by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the
person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist."
191. See, eg., Evans v. State, 645 P.2d 155 (Alaska 1982); Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz.
99, 297 P. 1029 (1931); Borland v. State, 158 Ark. 37, 249 S.W. 591 (1923); Perryman v.
State, 12 Okla. Crim. 500, 159 P. 937 (1916).
192'. E.g., Annotation, supra note 158, at 1239 ("fTihe decisions indicate that it is only
where the alcohol is introduced into the accused's system by Force Majeure that the intoxi-
cation would be regarded as involuntary . . . ."); Tackett v. Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 490,
492, 266 S.W. 26; 26-27 (1924) ("One's intoxication is not involuntary unless against his will,
as where he is compelled to drink by force ...."); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 457, 196
S.E.2d 777, 786 (1973) ("[I]t is only when alcohol has been introduced into a person's sys-
tem without his knowledge or by Force Majeure that his intoxication will be regarded as
involuntary."); Perryman v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. 500, 502, 159 P. 937, 938 (1916) ("In fact,
involuntary intoxication . .. can never exist where the person intoxicated .. .drinks the
intoxicant . . .without being made to do so by force..."). Cf. Special Project, supra note
129, at 1179 (arguing that such a strict coercion requirement is unjustified; instead advocat-
ing a standard similar to the requirement of that amount of duress needed to void a con-
tract-an amount short of physical force.).
193. See supra text accompanying note 24.
194. See Deposition of Maurice Williams at 28, State v. Horace Williams, No. 86-9275
CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. taken May 17, 1988) (noting how Maurice Williams had to inject his
brother Horace because Horace was unable to inject himself).
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normally is done with full consent. Consequently, the involuntari-
ness of a steroid-induced intoxication is not likely to be the result
of duress or coercion. 195
b. Pathological
Another form of intoxication which the common law charac-
terized as involuntary is a state known as "pathological intoxica-
tion."19 The Model Penal Code explains that pathological intoxi-
cation occurs "where the actor suffers a reaction to the substance
that is grossly excessive in degree and the actor did not know of his
special susceptibility."' In order to be "pathologically" intoxi-
cated the defendant not only must have some pre-existing condi-
tion that rendered him more susceptible to a particular intoxicant,
but also, and even more critical, this pre-existing condition must
be one of which he was not apprised. Again, only a handful of
courts have discussed such a notion; most of those courts have re-
jected its applicability because the defendant in the case was aware
of his unique susceptibility." 8
Implicit in the doctrine of pathological intoxication is the no-
tion that the defendant was aware he was ingesting an intoxi-
cant. This awareness would render the doctrine inapplicable to
195. It may be possible to make an argument that the modern athletic milieu "co-
erced" an athlete to use anabolic steroids, and that, consequently, any resulting intoxication
cannot be characterized as voluntary. See infra note 249 (suggesting that much of today's
steroid use is environmentally induced).
196. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120, § 4.10(0, at 394. See also Comment,
Pathological Intoxication and the Voluntarily Intoxicated Criminal Offender, 1969 UTAH
L. REv. 419.
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5) explanatory note at 350 (1985). See also id. § 2.08
comment at 364 (defining occurrence of pathological intoxication as those "cases in which an
intoxicating substance is knowingly taken into the body and, because of a bodily abnormal-
ity, intoxication of an extreme and unanticipated degree results. .. ").
198. E.g., Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1057 (1969); United States v. Jewette, 438 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.) (implicitly rejecting the notion
that intoxicants combined with a pre-existing mental condition would lead to involuntary
intoxication when the defendant was sufficiently apprised of his unique susceptibility), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971).
199. Implicit within the language of MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5) is the notion that
for the degree of intoxication to be out of the ordinary or "grossly excessive," there must
have been at least some amount of intoxication expected. This is so because if the substance
was not perceived to be an intoxicant the resulting intoxication would not be "pathological,"
but rather the result of an innocent mistake. See infra notes 217-228 and accompanying
text. See-also Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d at 737 (noting that "the clause 'intoxication
grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant' presumably comprehends
not only the idea that a person so afflicted knows that he has a lower tolerance to alcohol
than in the case of one not so afflicted, but that he knows, that, once the tolerance level has
been reached, the conduct induced thereby is usually more radical than otherwise would be
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the condition of a steroid-induced psychotic. With anabolic ster-
oids one often can assert that the afflicted defendant had no idea
that the drugs were intoxicants at all.200 Thus, it clearly would be
inaccurate to say that the defendant's resulting intoxication was
"atypical" or "grossly excessive in degree," as such language con-
notes that there is at least some sort of objective, reasonably ex-
pected intoxicating effect by which to assess the degree of the ac-
tual intoxication. Such an "expected" degree of intoxication is not
ascertainable, for it is arguably non-existent. Thus, pathological in-
toxication most likely would not be applicable in the case of a ster-
oid-induced psychotic. 01
c. Medically Prescribed
The common law also considered intoxication involuntary
where a defendant had become intoxicated from ingesting a pre-
scribed drug pursuant to medical advice and without being aware
of the drug's potential intoxicating effects.2 2 Like the other forms
the case.").
200. See supra note 217-228 and accompanying text.
201. However, if a steroid-induced psychosis is not a distinguishable phenomenon
from the well-documented aggressiveness that long has been known to accompany steroid
use, and assuming, arguendo, that the objectively expected increase in aggressiveness consti-
tutes a form of intoxication, then pathological intoxication might be a viable way to estab-
lish the involuntariness of this "intoxication." To wit, it has been said that certain persons
are susceptible in different, more far reaching ways to the effects of large amounts of hor-
mones being ingested into their bodies. See Taylor, supra note 19, at 65. If some persons,
because of their innate biological makeup are susceptible, beyond the expected increase in
aggressiveness, to a more far reaching intoxicating effect in the form of a psychosis, then
that intoxication very well could be pathological. If the expected aggressiveness is the objec-
tive standard of intoxication, a psychosis would be-clearly "atypical" or "grossly excessive."
Because the defendant would be unaware of his unique susceptibility to the excessive inges-
tion of synthetic hormones, the standard for pathological intoxication as set out by the
Model Penal Code would be satisfied. The same argument may be made when the psychiat-
ric repercussions of anabolic steroid use become more well known. Again, if an individual,
because of some pre-existing condition, is afflicted with a more far-reaching psychiatric ef-
fect than the degree of impairment which was commonly expected to accompany the psy-
chosis, then he might be pathologically intoxicated. In this scenario, the objective standard
of intoxication could be the degree of impairment expected to accompany the psychosis.
Any effect beyond this objective standard would be atypical or grossly excessive in degree.
202. W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 120, § 4.10(f), at j94. See, e.g., City of Minne-
apolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 468, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856-57 (1976); Prather v. Common-
wealth, 215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W. 559 (1926) (evidence that a defendant who was convicted of
fraudulent conversion of trust funds had been under the influence of morphine as a result of
an addiction created by a physician's postoperative prescription was sufficient to create a
jury question as to voluntariness); Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1955)
(holding that evidence of defendant's intoxication from overdose of narcotics prescribed by
a physician was sufficient for a jury question); Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412, 425, 143 A.2d
70, 77 (1958) (dicta) (recognizing that "involuntary intoxication caused by the unskilled ad-
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of involuntary intoxication, the instances for its use, let alone its
successful use, have been rare. 03 Nonetheless, the law's recognition
that the use of a medically prescribed drug may lead to involun-
tary intoxication may be of practical application in the case of a
steroid-induced psychotic. Since a considerable amount of the ster-
oids used in the United States is obtained through physicians,
20 4 it
is quite possible that any given steroid user obtained his drugs via
prescription. Further, most physicians who prescribe the drugs
probably are not aware that psychosis potentially is an effect of
excessive use.'15 Thus, it is a distinct possibility that a user is in-
gesting "prescribed" steroids, pursuant to medical advice, and
without the prescribing physician's having informed the user that a
severe psychosis is a possible side effect of the drug."o
As a result, the voluntariness of the resulting intoxication is
called into question. In City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 07 the
Minnesota Supreme Court, on one of the infrequent occasions
where the intoxication of the accused was held to be involuntary,"'8
announced a test to determine whether intoxication resulting from
prescribed drugs is involuntary. In order to classify the resulting
intoxication as involuntary, "the defendant must not know or have
reason to know that the prescribed drug is likely to have an intoxi-
ministration of a drug by a physician ordinarily constitutes a valid defense."). Cf. Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923) (finding that a defendant who drank whis-
key to kill pain of toothache, without doctor's advice, was voluntarily intoxicated); People v.
Koch, 250 A.D. 623, 294 N.Y.S. 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937) (concluding that defendant's
inadvertent overdose of a medically prescribed drug did not fall within the purview of a
D.W.I. statute's definition of voluntary intoxication).
203. Special Project, supra note 129, at 1181.
204. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
205. This is the result of the recency of the new findings and the large number of
recent journal articles which fail to mention psychosis as a side effect. See supra note 104
and accompanying text; Deposition of Dr. David L. Katz, M.D. at 72, State v. Horace Wil-
liams, No. 86-9275 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. taken May 9, 1988).
206. It is important to understand that just because a drug was prescribed by no
means indicates that the user was put on warning of all possible implications. Merill, Com-
pensation- For Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979). Professor Merill
explains:
[Elven complete physician candor will not assure that the patient will be
fully aware of the risks because the drug's manufacturer may not be adequately
informed or may not have conveyed to the physician all of the available informa-
tion .... For practical purposes, fully informed patient participation in the
selection and use of prescription drugs is an illusory goal.
Id. at 7-8.
207. 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (1976) (en banc).
208. The court held, specifically, that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an in-
struction on involuntary intoxication. 238 N.W.2d at 855.
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cating effect."''0 The test has a subjective component which pre-
cludes an assertion of involuntariness if the defendant had actual
knowledge of the intoxicating potential of the substance; in addi-
tion, a subjective/objective prong mandates an inquiry into
whether an accused had information from which a person of rea-
sonable intelligence would infer that psychiatric repercussions
could accompany steroid use.2 1 This subjective/objective prong
prevents an accused's claim of "I didn't know" from automatically
rendering his intoxication involuntary.
Applying the foregoing test it seems that the intoxication
brought on by prescribed anabolic steroids could be involuntary.
Absent actual knowledge, it is plausible to assert that the typical
steroid user is not armed with information from which a reasona-
ble man would draw the conclusion that a psychosis would be a
result of excessive use.211 There is an abundance of information
from which a user could make a reasonable inference as to the po-
tential for physiological side effects to accompany excessive steroid
use.21 2 This is not so with the recently discovered psychiatric side
effects. Arguably, most steroid users currently would not have the
information from which a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence
would make an inference that steroids are intoxicants.
21s
209. 238 N.W.2d at 857. The court also notes that the complete test requires the de-
fendant to prove that the intoxicant was the proximate cause of the condition and that the
condition is the equivalent of legal insanity. Id. Also required, yet rather self-evident, is that
the drug be prescribed. This requirement raises another collateral issue. If the policy is that
the accused's intoxication should be involuntary because he received the drug from someone
that he held in trust, should not the reasoning extend beyond the instances where the drug
is received from a doctor? Consider this argument in light of the claims that young athletes
often get steroids from persons who, though they are not physicians, still are in a position
where the athlete looks to them with trust. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The
Altimus test was, in essence, derived from the Model Penal Code definition for "self-in-
duced" intoxication. See Model Penal Code § 2,08(5)(b) (1985).
210. The Altimus test asks whether the defendant "had reason to know" of the intoxi-
cating potential of the substance. 238 N.W.2d at 857. The defendant has "reason to know"
where he has "knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence or of
the superior intelligence of the actor would either infer the existence of the fact in question
or would regard its existence as so highly probable that his conduct would be predicated
upon the assumption that the fact did exist." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 12 com-
ment a (1977).
211. See supra text accompanying note 112.
212.. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
213. But see supra note 112 (noting that the recent research has been reported in iron
game magazines). The accuracy of the textual assertion is dependent entirely upon the stan-
dard to which the law holds a particular steroid user. The "reason to know" standard ex-
pressly takes into consideration the superior intelligence of the actor. As a result, exper-
ienced athletes or steroid users may be held to a higher degree of culpability. Therefore,
certain steroid users may have "reason to know" that psychiatric repercussions may accom-
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Nonetheless, the efficacy of an argument that the "intoxica-
tion" is involuntary because it resulted from a prescribed drug is
reduced because of the practices of the "patient." When anabolic
steroids are prescribed, the user often does not limit the amount
ingested to the amount prescribed. Instead, athletes take amounts
far in excess of the prescribed dose, supplementing their supply on
the black market.214 An athlete who engaged in supplementation
would be foreclosed from claiming involuntary intoxication be-
cause, "where the intoxication is achieved by an overdose of the
medicine, the resulting intoxication has been viewed as the fault of
the accused."" 5
Recently enacted legislation also has limited the future appli-
cability of a claim of involuntariness under the medically pre-
scribed doctrine. In the past, only ethical considerations acted to
prevent a physician from prescribing anabolic steroids for a non-
medical purpose. However, new legislation, both federal and state,
has created a severe punitive disincentive which is likely to lower
the percentage of anabolic steroids which are obtained via pre-
scription. 216 It is obvious that as anabolic steroids are prescribed
less frequently, it becomes less likely that the "medically pre-
scribed" defense will be appropriate.
pany steroid use whereas a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence may not. Indeed, if a
certain steroid user had read one of the above-mentioned magazines and, as a result, he had
been apprised of the potential for psychiatric repercussions to accompany excessive steroid
use, the assertion in the text certainly is assailable. Arguably, reports of the recent findings
in these magazines could serve as information from which a reasonable man could make an
inference that the steroids may affect his cognitive capacity. As such, he would have "reason
to know" of the potential intoxicating effect of the substance, and it would be improper to
label any resulting intoxication as involuntary.
214. See supra text accompanying note 44.
215. Annotation, supra note 178, at 200. See People v. Turner, 680 P.2d 1290, 1293
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Generally, a prescription will serve to place a patient on notice that
an excessive dose will impair his faculties .... Therefore, where no controverting evidence is
presented, a trial court would be correct in finding that excessive use of a prescription drug
constituted voluntary intoxication."). Cf. People v. Koch, 250 A.D. 623, 294 N.Y.S. 987
(1937) (holding that extreme intoxication caused by inadvertent overdose was not voluntary
intoxication within a statute's definition).
216. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 2403, 102 Stat. 4230
(codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(e)(10) (West Supp. 1989)) (imposing criminal liability upon
"any person who distributes or possesses with the intent to distribute any anabolic steroid
for any use in humans other than the treatment of disease pursuant to the order of a physi-
cian . . . ."). Many states have adopted similar enactments either in the form of legislation
or administrative regulation. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11153.5 (West 1988
Supp.); Ohio Monthly Record, January 1988, at 861-862 (to be codified at § 4731-11-05 in
the OHIO ADMIN. CODE); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117(1)(v)-(w) (Supp. 1989).
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d. Mistake Of Fact
The final scenario in which the common law recognized intoxi-
cation as involuntary was where the accused had become intoxi-
cated after innocently ingesting a substance he did not know to be
an intoxicant.217 The doctrine essentially requires that the accused
make an innocent mistake of fact as to the intoxicating potential of
the substance he ingests; this mistake can occur with or without
the trickery or contrivance of another person.21 In either event,
217. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 120, § 4.10(f), at 394. See, e.g., People v. Low,
732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987) (dicta) (concluding that evidence that defendant charged with
first degree assault was afflicted with a temporary toxic psychosis due to the ingestion of 120
cough drops could have supported a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of involuntary
intoxication where the accused was neither aware of the possible intoxicating side effects of
the drops nor put on warning of such effects by past use); People v. Turner, 680 P.2d 1290
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (evidence that defendant did not know, and had not been warned, of
the intoxicating effect of a drug created a jury question as to the voluntariness of his result-
ing intoxication); People v. Penman, 271 Ill. 82, 110 N.E. 894 (1915) (holding that a defend-
ant charged with murder allegedly had been tricked into taking cocaine tablets thinking
them to be breath perfumers and, as such, it was error for the trial court to refuse evidence
of the circumstances surrounding the ingestion, for if a mistake was made it would have
rendered the intoxication involuntary); State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 P. 259 (1888) (hold-
ing that because an individual who drinks liquor not knowing of its intoxicating nature is
not voluntarily intoxicated, it was error for the trial court to both exclude evidence which
showed the defendants ignorance of the liquor's intoxicating nature and to instruct the jury
that one's ignorance was no excuse for crime); Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979) (evidence that defendant unknowingly consumed a drug preparation created a
jury question as to the voluntariness of intoxication).
218. Some commentators have claimed that involuntary intoxication by mistake of
fact is exemplified primarily by the individual who is tricked or deceived by the act of an-
other into ingesting a substance which he did not know to have intoxicating capabilities.
See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10(0, at 394; Special Project, supra
note 129, at 1180. Some courts have approached the issue in this manner. See, e.g., State v.
Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 206 (Iowa 1974); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238
N.W.2d 851 (1976) (en banc). Using such restrictive circumstances to describe the scenario
in which an innocent mistake of fact occurs is natural because in many of the cases in which
an individual did make an innocent mistake of fact the mistake was the result of an affirma-
tive act by a third party. See, e.g., People v. Penman, 271 Il1. 82, 110 N.E. 894 (1915); Torres
v. State, 585 S,W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). However, it is illogical to require a defend-
ant claiming involuntary intoxication by innocent mistake of fact to show an affirmative act
by a third party. Foreseeability of an intoxicating effect, regardless of another's contrivance
or machinations, should.be the relevant inquiry. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (1985)
(not requiring an affirmative act of another in order to render intoxication not "self-in-
duced"); COLO. REy. STAT. § 18-1-804(5) (1986) (statutory definition of "self-induced" intox-
ication tracks Model Penal Code's definition in section 2.08(5)(b)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-
203 (1989) (no requirement of an affirmative act by another to render intoxication involun-
tary; recognizes defense when defendant "proves that he did not know that it was an intoxi-
cating substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise ingested the
substance causing the condition."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 423-424 (1987) (statute does
not require an affirmative act by another to establish involuntary intoxication). Cf. Low, 732
P.2d at 627 (dicta) ("Involuntary intoxication by definition occurs when the defendant does
not knowingly ingest an intoxicating substance or ingests a substance not known to be an
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consistent with the other forms of the involuntary intoxication de-
fense, the occasions for claiming that one's intoxication was invol-
untary due to an innocent mistake have been infrequent.,
One court has defined "involuntary" intoxication as the con-
verse of that which is "self-induced. '2 0 Consequently, the Model
Penal Code's definition of "self-induced intoxication" informs
analysis in this scenario. Section 2.08(5)(b) of the Model Penal
Code defines "self-induced intoxication" as "intoxication caused by
substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the
tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to
know."' 22' If this definition of "self-induced intoxication" is ex-
pressed in the negative, the result is a standard for determining
when intoxication is not "self-induced" or, alternatively put, is in-
voluntary. Under this standard, involuntary intoxication might be
defined as that intoxication caused by substances that the actor
knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause
intoxication he does not know, nor which he ought to have known.
Although this logical inversion would state the test in terms of
whether the defendant "ought to have known," that approach
would be slightly inconsistent with the tack the language in the
commentary to the Model Penal Code seems to suggest. The com-
mentary notes that the Code's definition of "self-induced intoxica-
tion" affords a defense to the individual who was intoxicated "by a
substance whose tendency to intoxicate the actor does not know
intoxicant) (emphasis added); DeBerry v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Ky.) ("One
who commits a crime under the influence of a drug should be held guilty if he takes the
drug knowing the effect it is likely to have.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881
(1956).
2i9. See Special Project, supra note 129, at 1180.
220. Low, 732 P.2d at 627 (citing COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-1-804(3) (1986)).
221. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (1985). Implicit in section 2.08(5)(b), as well
as in the state codifications which parallel it, is the notion that the relevant inquiry must be
foreseeability. At least one Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that to define
"self-induced" as the mechanical ingestion of the drug, ignoring the foreseeability of its
intoxicating nature, is incompatible with the modern notions of criminal responsibility. See
State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Iowa 1974) (LeGrand, J., dissenting) ("I am convinced
that voluntary as here used should relate to a knowledgeable acceptance of the danger and
risk involved."). The relevant inquiry would become: Did the defendant foresee, or should
he reasonably have foreseen, that the substance he was ingesting was an intoxicant? Cf.
Torres, 585 S.W.2d at 748 ("Although she voluntarily drank the preparation, unless she
knew it contained the drug her actions were not a volitional consumption of the intoxi-
cant."); DeBerry, 289 S.W.2d at 497 ("One who commits a crime under the influence of a
drug should be held guilty if he takes the drug knowing the effect it is likely to have.")
(emphasis added); Annotation, supra note 178, at 201 ("A mistake or misjudgment concern-
ing the potency of the intoxicant, or concerning one's capacity for the intoxicant, it is uni-
formly held, will not render the resulting intoxication involuntary as long as the individual
knew that he was consuming an intoxicant.) (emphasis added).
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and has no reason to know."2 ' Because the commentary's ap-
proach in applying the "mistake of fact" doctrine would implement
the same "reason to know" standard which the Altimus court used
for determining whether an individual is involuntarily intoxicated
from a prescription drug,28 this Article will analyze a mistake of
fact using the "reason to know" standard in furtherance of a uni-
form approach.' Consequently, absent actual knowledge, the crit-
222. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment at 364 (1985).
223. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
224. An alternative approach is possible. Professor Low has noted that, in his estima-
tion, "[t]he phrase 'ought to know' probably incorporates the standard of negligence defined
in § 2.02(2)(d) [of the Model Penal Code]." P. Low, supra note 156, at 154. Section
2.02(2)(d) provides that "[a] person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985). In
addition, the section superimposes upon this definition a requirement that this "risk must
be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation."
Id. Were this standard used to give life to the nebulous phrase "ought to know," the test to
assess whether an individual's intoxication was not self-induced would in essence ask
whether the accused actually knew he was ingesting an intoxicant or whether he should
have-been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was ingesting an intoxicant.
Although the ultimate answer to this question is, of course, fact-dependent, a general appli-
cation of the negligence standard to a steroid-induced psychosis may be useful.
As section 1.13(10) of the Model Penal Code reveals that the term "material element"
encompasses matters relating to the existence of an excuse for the actor's conduct, the pres-
ence of intoxication would be a material element of an involuntary intoxication defense.
Having established that the presence of intoxication is a material element, the analysis
moves to an assessment of the nature of the risk that this element exists. In the present
context" the inquiry asks whether the risk that intoxication will result from the ingestion of
anabolic steroids is both substantial and unjustifiable. "The term 'substantial' refers to the
degree of likelihood that the element exists or will result." P. Low, supra note 156, at 93.
"The term 'unjustifiable' refers to the reasons one might have for taking the risk and re-
quires that these reasons not be good ones." Id. Assessing the nature of the risk in terms of
this standard is purely the domain of the trier of fact in each unique situation and it is
difficult to predict the outcome on a case to case basis. For example, the term "substantial,"
defined in terms of the likelihood the element exists or will result, is a relative term which is
capable of being interpreted in many ways. In the current context, it is just as plausible to
argue that the risk of being overwhelmed by a steroid-induced psychosis is substantial as it
is to argue that it is not. Similarly, the term unjustifiable can be construed different ways by
different persons. While Professor Low's articulation of the meaning which inheres in the
"unjustifiable" prong is excellent, and as good as we are going to get, it still begs the ques-
tion: what reasons are "good" reasons? Is it justifiable for a weightlifter to use anabolic
steroids in training to achieve Olympic glory for the United States? How about an NFL
linebacker striving to bring home a Super Bowl championship to his economically depressed
community? Are these good reasons which would make steroid use justifiable despite the
risk of intoxication? While some may say they are not, others might disagree. Clearly, the
normative component of the inquiry makes the determination uniquely one for the trier of
fact.
Assuming, arguendo, that the risk is substantial and unjustifiable, the next inquiry
seeks to determine whether the accused should have been aware of this risk. Attempting to
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ical inquiry becomes: did the accused have reason to know that the
answer this query illuminates the difference between defining the term "ought to know" in
section 2.08(4) by means of the "reason to know" standard as opposed to defining it in
terms of the negligence standard of section 2.02(d)(2). The difference stems from section
2.02's application of the mental state "should know." As the Restatement (Second) of Torts
notes, "[tihese two phrases ["reason to know" and "should know"] ... differ in that 'reason
to know' implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas 'should know' im-
plies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in question." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 comment at 20 (1965). Specifically, "'should know' indicates
that the actor is under a duty to another to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the exis-
tence or non-existence of the fact in question and that he would acertain the existence
thereof in the proper performance of that duty." Id. The existence of a duty to investigate
sheds new light on the issue of involuntariness. It appears at least plausible that, in light of
the recent media reports documenting the potential for psychosis to accompany steroid use,
a reasonably diligent investigation might reveal the existence of the risk. In contrast, it is
clear that many steroid users who do not make an investigation will continue to lack infor-
mation from which a reasonable person would infer the existence of the fact in question,
namely the potential for anabolic steroid use to produce intoxication. Consequently, it is
possible that an accused may not have "reason to know" of the risk, but, at the same time,
because of the potential for the intoxicating capability of anabolic steroids to be the product
of a reasonably diligent investigation, the same accused potentially "should know" of the
risk.
If the trier of fact concludes that the accused should have been aware of what is, as-
sumptively, a substantial and unjustifiable risk, the final requirement necessary to establish
that an accused was negligent is a determination by the trier of fact that the "failure of the
defendant to perceive the risk involved a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would have observed in the actor's situation." P. Low, supra note 156, at
96. In essence, this portion of the inquiry requires the trier of fact to determine whether the
failure of an anabolic-steroid user to perceive the risk that his ingestion of steroids may lead
to intoxication constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that would be ob-
served by a reasonable person who was embarking upon or continuing a steroid regimen.
Again, this seems like an issue upon which reasonable jurors could differ. On the one hand,
it seems plausible to argue that where an individual knows that steroids will have some
mental effect in the form of increased aggressiveness it is a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care not to investigate further to determine if other, more far-reaching mental-sta-
tus changes may occur. On the other hand, one also can argue that a reasonable person in a
steroid user's position would not extend his investigation beyond the multitude of authori-
ties which indicate that the sole mental status change to accompany anabolic steroid use is
an increase in aggressiveness. See supra note 104. As such, the failure of an accused to do so
could not be a gross deviation from the standard of care.
Policy issues may inform a court's decision as to the proper standard to apply when
assessing a steroid user's mistake of fact as to the intoxicating nature of the steroids he
ingested. While the authors recommend a "reason to know" standard, there may be policy
based reasons for adopting the negligence standard and its "should know" mental state. As
"should know" is completely objective and imposes a duty to investigate in an effort to
ascertain the fact in question, a court may apply this somewhat stricter standard to a "mis-
take of fact" scenario while applying a "reason to know" standard when dealing with an
involuntariness claim based on the use of prescribed steroids. The court might reason that
the objective "should know" standard, and its appurtanant duty to investigate, rightfully is
imposed in a situation where a user is ingesting black market steroids. In contrast, the court
might find that the more lenient subjective/objective "reason to know" standard, and its
lack of a duty to investigate, is more appropriate in the context of prescription drugs be-
cause of the users potential reliance on the expertise of the physician to inform him of any
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substance he ingested was an intoxicant.2 25
Currently, this question may be answered in the negative for
steroids. The psychiatric repercussions that can accompany the use
of anabolic steroids have come to light only recently and, even
now, awareness of these effects is'for the most part limited to iso-
lated sectors of the public.22 ' Although the new findings have re-
ceived some scattered publicity,2 " this media coverage is suffi-
ciently limited so that a steroid user might not have information
from which a reasonable man would infer that anabolic steroids
were intoxicants.2 2 8 Lacking such information, a steroid user would
not have "reason to know" that the drugs he was ingesting were
intoxicating substances. Consequently, a user afflicted with a ster-
oid-induced psychosis may, as a result of a mistake of fact, be in-
voluntarily intoxicated. In fact, the intoxication which results from
anabolic steroid use could,, at this point in time, be the paradigm of
that which is involuntary.
e. Arguments Against Characterizing the Intoxication As Involun-
tary
Because it would be beneficial to defense counsel, prosecutors,
and judges who find themselves having to address the issue, a dis-
cussion of the arguments which may be offered against the applica-
tion of the involuntary intoxication defense to a steroid-induced
psychosis follows.
dangers. At the very least, the "reason to know" standard must be applied to an individual
intoxicated by the ingestion of prescribed steroids because it is clearly illogical to impose a
duty to investigate upon individuals who obtain drugs through a physician. In short, there
may be a principled reason for the standard to differ in the "prescribed steroid" and "mis-
take of fact" scenarios.
225. See supra note 210 for a definition of "reason to know."
226. Deposition of Dr. David L. Katz, M.D., supra note 205, at 72. See also supra note
104 (noting the many recent articles and books which fail to mention a psychosis among the
list of side-effects).
227. See, e.g., Monmaney & Robins, The Insanity of Steroid Abuse, NEWSWEEK, May
23, 1988, at 75; Altman, New "Breakfast of Champions": A Recipe for Victory or Disaster,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at 34, col. 6.
228. But see supra note 213 (noting that an individual may have information that
steroids are intoxicants; if so, he would have reason to know). Even so, it is important that
we as a modern society avoid what is a common human tendency, namely the tendency to
ignorantly chastise with the response, "If I knew, he surely knew." This is not always true.
See People v. Turner, 680 P.2d 1290 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (suggesting that "[tlo deny the
defendant the chance to go to the jury on the issue of whether his intoxication was involun-
tary ... is to give more weight to what might be assumed to be common knowledge of the
effects of ingesting an excessive dose of a drug, than the specific evidence elicited on the
subject."). Id. at 1293. Cf. Yessis, supra note 95, at 39, 172 (recognizing that many individu-
als engage in steroid use blind to the potential side effects of their use).
1989]
51
Bidwill and Katz: Injecting New Life into an Old Defense: Anabolic Steroid-Induced
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
52 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
i. Is This Really Something New?
Prosecutors inevitably will argue that any claimed distinction
between the well-documented ability of anabolic steroids to in-
crease aggressiveness and the potential for steroid use to lead to a
debilitating psychosis is completely artificial. They will argue that
these two psychological side effects are not completely exclusive
and that this psychosis is nothing more than the commonly per-
ceived increase in aggressiveness raised to a higher degree." 9
However, as this Article previously established,8 0 the psycho-
sis clearly is distinguishable from a mere increase in aggressiveness
in that an anabolic steroid-induced psychosis, as defined, falls
within the Model Penal Code's definition of intoxication while an
increase in aggressiveness does not. Moreover, the potential for an-
abolic steroid use to lead to a debilitating psychosis is a side effect
which is arguably unforeseen by users. In essence, psychosis, it be-
ing distinguishable from a mere increase in aggressiveness, sits
alone, unnoted by the steroid users of today. " " As such, most ster-
oid users would not have information from which a person of ordi-
nary intelligence would have foreseen or perceived it as a potential
side effect of their steroid use and thus, absent actual knowledge,
an individual afflicted by such a psychosis may have been afflicted
involuntarily.
ii. The Inevitable Analogy to the LSD Cases
Prosecutors may analogize claims of a steroid-induced psycho-
sis to the LSD'5  cases. s In the 1970's, hallucinogenic drug users
charged with various crimes set up an involuntary intoxication de-
fense based on their use of LSD.'" They argued that LSD and
229. Assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that the aggressiveness itself were in-
toxication, the reasonable steroid user probably should have known that such a state could
have resulted from his use of the drugs. Indeed, there is "a large amount of 'common' infor-
mation and lore among athletes, who consider changes of mood, temperament, and personal-
ity to be among the drugs' most characteristic effects." Katz & Pope, supra note 90, at 41.
In accord with the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 284 A.2d 798
(1971) and State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974), because the psychosis would be noth-
ing more than an unpredictable degree of an otherwise foreseeable intoxication, it would be
voluntary. See infra notes 232-242 and accompanying text. A claim that the user was a mere
victim of misjudgment with respect to the potency would not be sufficient to render it invol-
untary. Annotation, supra note 178, at 201.
230. See supra note 107-111 and accompanying text.
231. See Yessis, supra note 95, at 172.
232. LSD is the acronym for lysergic acid diethylamide.
233. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 284 A.2d 798 (1971); State v.
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other hallucinogenic drugs had a more far-reaching mental effect
than alcohol, and that since it was unknown how far this effect did
reach, they should be considered involuntarily intoxicated due to a
mistake as to the extent of the resulting intoxication.2 "5 The claims
were roundly rejected. Using these cases, the prosecution argument
in a steroid-induced psychosis case may begin with the premise
that these other jurisdictions have treated the intoxication pro-
duced by hallucinogenic drugs as voluntary, in effect analogizing it
to alcohol intoxication, even though the exact degree of the intoxi-
cation resulting from hallucinogenic drugs frequently is unforesee-
able.2 86 Applying this reasoning to anabolic steroids, the prosecutor
would claim that anabolic steroids are drugs and, as was true in
the LSD cases, no distinction is permissible between the degree of
their mind-altering effects so as to render impairment of a lesser
degree voluntary and that to a greater degree involuntary.137 Ab-
sent an adoption of the premise that psychosis is distinguishable
from aggressiveness,3& this argument is certainly valid.
However, as this Article urges, aggressiveness is distinguisha-
ble from psychosis in that the latter constitutes intoxication while
the former does not; the LSD cases, therefore, are distinguishable.
In essence, a common denominator that was present in the LSD
cases is absent with anabolic steroid use. In each of the LSD cases
Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974).
235. See id. (rejecting the argument that defendant who knowingly took'a mind affect-
ing drug, but was afflicted in an unpredictable fashion, should be rendered involuntarily
intoxicated); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 495, 284 A.2d 798, 801 (1971) (re-
jecting argument that intoxication, resulting from a knowing and willing ingestion of LSD,
should not be equated to voluntary intoxication from alcohol because the resulting degree of
said intoxication is, unpredictable). Although these courts rejected the argument, others
have not been so confident that it was that misguided. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d at
211-214 (LeGrand, J., dissenting); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 511 (8th Cir.
1974) ("In light of the changing state of medical knowledge regarding hallucinogens, we
think the district court may have underestimated the unique and potentially dangerous im-
pact that prolonged use of LSD appears to have on the psychological state and behavioral
pattern of some users."); Pierce v. 'Turner, 402 F.2d 109, 112-113 (10th Cir. 1968) ("We
anticipate of course; that the demands of due process may require adjustment and refine-
ment in traditional and "stock" instructions on the subject of criminal responsibility in view
of the frightening effects of hallucinatory drugs.") (dicta), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950 (1969).
236. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 334, 529 P:2d 231, 233 (1974); State v.
Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 1974); State v. Roisland, 1 Or. App. 68, 77, 459 P.2d 555,
559 (1969) ("The voluntary use of intoxicants other than alcohol is comparable to the volun-
tary use of alcohol .... There is no reason why the culpability should not be the same.");
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 495, 284 A.2d 798, 801 (1971).
237. See Campbell, 284 A.2d at 801; State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974). Cf. id.
at 213 (LeGrand, J., dissenting) ("To treat all (drugs] alike simply because each is classified
generally as a drug strikes me as a judicial copout.").
238. See supra note 107-111 and accompanying text.
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the substance ingested by the accused was perceived to have at
least some intoxicating potential.23 9 There remains a critical differ-
ence with anabolic steroids. In the case of anabolic steroids the in-
toxicating effect is involuntary not because, as was argued in the
LSD cases, the intoxicating effect is greater than otherwise would
be perceived, but because there is an intoxicating effect at all. 40 In
the LSD cases, the defendants had knowledge that the substance
ingested at least would have some intoxicating effect.2 4' Again, as-
suming that aggressiveness is distinguishable from the psychosis,
most anabolic steroid users have no knowledge that the substances
might have an intoxicating effect. Since the only psychological side
effect commonly perceived to accompany anabolic steroid use has
been increased aggressiveness, and since aggressiveness does not
fall within the Model Penal Code's definition of intoxication, ster-
oids never have been perceived as intoxicants. 2
239. See Campbell, 284 A.2d at 799 n.1 ("Campbell stated that he had taken LSD...
on three previous occasions."); Hall, 205 N.W.2d at 208 ("If [defendant's] own testimony is
believed he knew it was a mind-affecting drug.").
240. Cf. Annotation, supra note 178, at 203 (defines "voluntary" as "the natural and
reasonably foreseeable outcome of an accused's voluntary conduct .... "). But see Campbell,
284 A.2d at 801 ("The very fact that the effects of a voluntary, non-medical use of a halluci-
nogenic drug are predictably unforeseeable should require courts to decide in the public
interest that this is not legally sufficient to completely exculpate . . .
241. See supra note 239.
242. Making the assumption that the two psychological side effects resulting from ana-
bolic steroid use are distinguishable, and assuming further that one constitutes intoxication
while the other does not, it is possible to argue that the theme of the LSD cases is inapplica-
ble to the present issue. However, it is certainly an open question as to whether the courts
will accept the necessary premise. In fact, theoretical niceties frequently fail to translate
into judicially cognizable distinctions. In reality, it is possible that a court addressing the
issue will reject this Article's premise, assuming instead that a steroid-induced psychosis is
merely an aggravated degree of the otherwise foreseeable side effect of increased aggressive-
ness. If a court rejects the distinction, the LSD cases could be used to frame an argument
against characterizing the psychosis as an involuntary intoxication.
In the past, serious mental status changes have been noted with other medications not
viewed by physicians or patients as intoxicants. See Drugs That Cause Psychiatric Symp-
toms, 26 THE MEDICAL Lgirs ON DRUGS AND THERAPEUTICS 75 (August 17, 1984). However,
if the defendant had experienced a temporary psychosis as a result of his steroid use on a
prior occasion, this experience should serve to put him on warning of its possible effects.
Assuming, of course, that the user recognized his psychotic behavior and its causal relation-
ship to his steroid use, he would have had "reason to know" that psychotic effects could be a
consequence of the steroid use. As a result, the intoxication clearly would be voluntary. See
Annotation, supra note 178, at 203 ("As a general proposition, past experience with the
intoxicant, or other information which puts the accused on notice that he will suffer a vio-
lent intoxicating reaction from a particular intoxicant has ordinarily been considered suffi-
cient to treat the intoxication as voluntary.").
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iii. A User Of A Black Market Drug Should Be On Warning
A third argument would note that because steroids usually are
obtained on a black market that consists of unreliable and un-
known sources,""3 a steroid user of ordinary intelligence ought to
have information from which he could infer that the consequences
of steroid use could be unpredictable. " The argument would rea-
son that a steroid user, while he might not be held to know specifi-
cally that steroids would cause a psychosis, most likely has infor-
mation from which he can infer that steroids are drugs, and that
appurtenant to drug use, especially inordinate amounts of an un-
known quality, is the possibility for wild, unforeseeable mental ef-
fects 45 The argument reduced to its simplest form is "buyer be-
ware": he who uses black market drugs is per se on notice that
anything may happen as a result of the use. The mistake of fact it
is recalled must be innocent."6 It is at least arguable that knowing
use of a black market drug would preclude any assertion that one's
mistake was innocent.
iv. Illegal?
A final argument is closely related to the last. This argument
finds its roots in the observation that a steroid-induced psychosis
is the result of the self-administered use of an illegal drug.. 47 Re-
243. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., H. FINGARE T & A. HASSE, supra note 146, at 112 ("[One] deliberately
takes the risk that as a result of the ingestion of drugs he may commit a serious harm.").
See also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 284 A.2d at 801 ("The very fact that the effects of a
voluntary, non-medical use of a hallucinogenic drug are predictably unforseeable should re-
quire courts to decide in the public interest that this is not legally sufficient to completely
exculpate .... ").
245. While this argument is otherwise well grounded, it implicitly makes an assump-
tion that is far from realistic. It assumes that the reasonable man takes anabolic steroids
recognizing that they, at least in some way, could affect his mind. In light of the growing
evidence that steroid users are gravely uninformed and suffer from alarming misconceptions
about the drugs, such an assumption is unreasonable. In terms of the drugs efficacy, all the
user sees is bigger muscles and more strength. The deleterious effects they perceive, if any,
are likely to be the claims of liver disorders and cancer, as well as the visually perceptible
ache and testicular shrinkage. Quite simply the effects they recognize, both good and bad,
are often purely physical. See Yessis, supra note 95, at 172.
246. See supra text accompanying note 217.
247. See Murder Conviction, Miami Herald, June 8,1988, at 4A, col. 2 (quoting Prose-
cutor Richard Burton: "This is voluntary use of illegal drugs."). This argument is grounded
in public policy. If a person who commits a crime after ingesting an illegal drug can com-
pletely escape punishment, a dangerous precedent purportedly is set. However, the illegality
of anabolic steroid use is a very fact-dependent issue. Anabolic steroids are controlled sub-
stances under Florida Law. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.03(4)(b) (West Supp. 1988). As such, it is
unlawful in Florida to possess steroids that were not prescribed lawfully by a physician. FLA.
1989]
55
Bidwill and Katz: Injecting New Life into an Old Defense: Anabolic Steroid-Induced
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
56 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
calling that the mistake of fact necessary to render the resulting
intoxication involuntary must be innocent,24  it is plausible that a
determination that the drug use which produced the intoxication
was illegal would make such a finding of innocence unlikely. Yet,
the term "innocent" cannot always be defined rigidly; illegality
STAT. ANN. § 893.13(l)(f) (West Supp. 1988). However, if the steroids are lawfully prescribed
the use would not be illegal. Therefore, even in a state such as Florida where anabolic ster-
oids are controlled substances, all .use is not per se illegal. Moreover, beyond Florida and
other states that have included anabolic steroids in their schedules of controlled substances,
see e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11056(f) (West Supp. 1988), the issue is even more
muddled.
Federal law does not require the Food and Drug Administration to list all the drugs
that are dispensable only by prescription. Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 70,077. Conse-
quently, the "initial determination of whether a drug for human use should be restricted to
prescription sale under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is generally the responsi-
bility of the manufacturer or distributor." Id. However, a federal court has held that hor-
mones, including natural testosterone and its synthetic analogues, were not safe and effica-
cious for use except under the supervision of a physician. United States v. EI-O-Pathic
Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62, 74 (9th Cir. 1951). Consequently, anabolic steroids today clearly
only are dispensable by prescription. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1982) (providing that a drug
found not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner shall be dispensed only
by written prescription, oral prescription, or by lawfully refilling an oral or written prescrip-
tion); PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 31, at 1975, 2254 (1988) (anabolic steroids
listed as prescription drugs). It is important to note that while the drugs in a jurisdiction's
schedule of controlled substances can be distributed only by prescription, many other drugs
that do not appear within the controlled substance schedule similarly may be distributed
only by prescription. After El-O-Pathic, anabolic steroids are among the latter, even if not
included among the former.
Nonetheless, anabolic steroids are not controlled substances under federal law, nor
under the laws of most states. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) (ana-
bolic steroids not included within the United States Code's schedules of controlled sub-
stances). As such, one who merely possesses anabolic steroids without a prescription, having
no intent to sell, is not in violation of federal law. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.03 (West
1988) (illegal to possess prescription drug in Florida without a prescription) with 21
U.S.C.A. § 844 (1988 Supp.) (unlawful under federal law to possess a controlled substance
without a prescription). In fact, one commentator has noted that not including a drug
within the constraints of the federal Controlled Substances Act would amount to
decriminalizing the substance. Mitchell, Deregulating Mandatory Medical Prescription, 12
AM. J. L. & MED. 207, 234 (1986). Moreover, if prescribed the use clearly would not be
illegal. In essence, a blanket statement that all steroid use constitutes "illegal" drug use does
not always prove true.
Some may claim that the recent Congressional action proscribing the prescription of
anabolic steroids would seem to take the wind out of any argument that steroid use is often
legal. Nonetheless, even if a physician has violated the law by prescribing for sports use, the
prescribee's use pursuant to an otherwise lawful prescription would still seem not to be in
violation of the law. However, legislation has been introduced recently towards the end of
making anabolic steroids controlled substances. See H.R. 3216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (intro-
duced Aug. 7, 1987) (proposing to amend § 202 of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. §
812(c) by adding methandrostenolone [Dianabol] to Schedule I.). See generally Uzych, Ster-
oids and the Law, MUSCLE & FITNESS, Feb. 1989, at 119 (surveying the various state and
federal statutes bearing on the distribution and use of anabolic steroids).
248. See .supro text accompanying note 217.
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should not, per se, equate to "not innocent." Instead, the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances must be considered. In some
plausible scenarios the factual circumstances could be such that a
reasonable juror might find that a mistake as to the intoxicating
nature of a drug was innocent, although the use of that drug is
illegal.249 Therefore, the uninformed public, as well as the courts,
249. This Article has asserted that anabolic steroids are being used by many who are
gravely uninformed as to the potential of the drugs to produce psychotic repercussions--a
class which arguably includes the hundreds of thousands of adolescents who reportedly are
using the drugs. See supra note 70. These statistics create the potential for interesting hy-
pothetical situations.
It is possible that despite an accused's steroid use being illegal, a jury might be so
moved by the surrounding circumstances of a case that it concludes the individual's steroid
use was innocent. A plausible hypothetical should clarify this proposition. Assume Monte, a
15 year old altar boy with no previous criminal record, from a good home, at the behest of
his football coach, friends, and parents, and fueled by environmentally induced dreams of
athletic success, begins using anabolic steroids which he purchases on the black market.
Also, assume that Monte lives in Miami, Florida, a jurisdiction in which his mere possession
and use of the steroids without a prescription is illegal. See supra note 247. Further, assume
that Monte uses the steroids having no notion that they have any effect on the mind, let
alone that they can cause a debilitating psychosis. Finally, let us say Monte, without any
previous psychotic symptoms, becomes overwhelmed by a psychosis and brutally axes his
beautiful mother Rocky to death. Suddenly Monte emerges from his cognitive disattach-
ment to find himself manacled hand and foot, faced with charges of first degree murder and
the possibility of death in the electric chair. In light of these tragic circumstances, a jury
might reject a prosecutor's claim that because Monte's steroid use was illegal, it is per se
"not innocent."
Moreover, the potential for immensely disparate results emerges because of the re-
quirement that one's mistake be innocent. For example, two individuals who become over-
whelmed by a psychosis and commit heinous murders might attempt to advance an involun-
tary intoxication defense. Let us assume that the first individual lives in Florida where mere
possession of anabolic steroids is illegal and that the second lives in a jurisdiction where it is
not. Because the first individual's steroid use was illegal, a jury might find his mistake "not
innocent" and reject his involuntary intoiication defense, subjecting him to the full brunt of
the law. In contrast, because the second individual's use was not illegal, a jury might charac-
terize his mistake as innocent, allowing him to establish that his intoxication was involun-
tary. If the charge was first degree murder, the first, living in Florida, potentially could be
sentenced to death; the second, if successful in establishing the other elements of the invol-
untary intoxication defense, might walk away completely exculpated. Obviously, immensely
disparate treatment of two offenders might result because of the mere coincidence that one's
steroid use was legal while the other's was not.
This potential for disparate results is illuminated further within the context of the
above hypothetical. Let us compare Monte's plight to that of his friend Gerry. If Gerry had
become overwhelmed by a steroid-induced psychosis and also had committed a heinous
murder, but, unlike Monte, had obtained and used his steroids in a state where possession
without a prescription is not illegal, his use would have been legal, his mistake potentially
innocent, and he would have a legitimate claim that his intoxication was the result of an
innocent mistake of fact. Gerry, if successful in establishing the other elements of the invol-
untary intoxication defense, might walk away completely exculpated. As noted above, were a
jury to determine that Monte's illegal drug use prevented his mistake from being innocent,
he would be unable to establish an involuntary intoxication defense (at least under the
"mistake of fact" prong of the involuntary intoxication doctrine) and, assuming he was una-
1989]
57
Bidwill and Katz: Injecting New Life into an Old Defense: Anabolic Steroid-Induced
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
58 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
should avoid infringing on the role of the juror by making whole-
sale determinations of what is and is not innocent conduct. In fact,
in most cases the requirements of due process command that the
issue be given to the trier of fact and also should prevent a court
from prohibiting a defendant's raising such a defense.250
In sum, as long as the public remains uninformed of the psy-
chiatric repercussions that may accompany anabolic steroid use, it
is possible to assert that a steroid-induced psychotic was involun-
tarily intoxicated because he innocently mischaracterized the ana-
bolic steroids he ingested as non-intoxicating substances. While
some equally plausible arguments against such a conclusion can be
asserted, the applicability of these arguments, like those in sup-
port, is wholly dependent upon the factual circumstances. Conse-
quently, there should be but one iron-clad rule: the issue of the
innocence of the defendant's mistake of fact is uniquely the prov-
ince of the trier of fact.
ble to establish some other defense, may be convicted and subject to the death penalty.
There are arguments, beyond the emotionally compelling facts of a specific case, that
counsel might advance in an effort to establish that a defendant's steroid use was innocent
despite it being illegal. One argument draws its strength from the potential role our modern
society plays in inducing anabolic steroid use. Specifically, it might be argued that much of
today's steroid use is environmentally induced, a product of society's inordinately rewarding
the performances enhanced by anabolic steroids at all levels. See, e.g., Marino Tops NFL
Salary List With $1.45 Million in 1988, Miami Herald, Jan. 14, 1988, at ID, col. 1 (report
that 13 NFL players made at least $1 million dollars in 1988 evidences the substantial re-
wards American society bestows upon professional athletes); BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
MIAMI 25 (Undergraduate Studies 1988-89) (four year athletic scholarship at the University
of Miami, measured in tuition costs alone, would be worth in excess of $40,000); Douglas,
Steroids:The Myth and the Reality, MUSCLEMAG, Feb. 1989, at 87, 89 ("It's estimated that
Ben Johnson lost eleven million dollars worth of endorsements due to his loss of the gold
medal."). Although the costs of using steroids are prevalent in terms of both physical harm
and potential stigma, see Anderson, Convicted For Speeding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1988, at
53, col. I (disqualified gold medalist lives forever with a tainted reputation), it is clear that
the cost/benefit ratio created by the modern athletic milieu has given athletes much incen-
tive to use the drugs. See Janofsky & Alfano, Victory At Any Cost: Drug Pressure Growing,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1988, at 1. 34, col. 1. Consequently, counsel might argue that for the
modern athletic environment to induce steroid use without informing the user of the
psychotic ramifications, and for the law then to deny that user the opportunity to utilize the
defense of involuntary intoxication on the grounds that the use may be illegal, or alterna-
tively, because the user of black market steroids "should have known," produces a result
which is morally questionable. As Professor Kadish so poignantly stated: "To blame a per-
son is to express a moral criticism ...." S. KADISH, supra note 114, at 87. Thus, when
society criticizes an individual for the ultimate result of drug use, use which society itself
possibly has induced without warning of its implications, one might conclude society has
become guilty of a grave degree of hypocrisy.
250. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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If the potential exculpation of a steroid-induced psychotic of-
fends public sensibilities, a simple solution is available. By educat-
ing current and potential steroid users as to the possible "intoxi-
cating" effects of anabolic steroid use the involuntariness of this
use would be eliminated.2 51 If a reasonable man ought to know that
these drugs can cause this intoxicating effect, then the resulting
intoxication would be considered self-induced and, as such, never
would result in complete exculpation. Consequently, American
governmental bodies, through education, must make the psychiat-
ric repercussions that may accompany steroid use reasonably fore-
seeable. If government begins to inform the public of the drastic
psychological possibilities that may accompany steroid abuse, the
oppressiveness of punishing those who commit crime while intoxi-
cated from steroids would be eliminated, for the intoxication no
longer would be involuntary.252
2. State of Mind Must Equate To Legal Insanity
Even if America's leaders decide not to educate, it must be
251. Recently-enacted California legislation provides an excellent model of an educa-
tion program which, if effectively utilized, could eliminate the "involuntariness" of the in-
toxication which results from the ingestion of anabolic steroids. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §
51262 (West Supp. 1988) ("In order to increase the knowledge of students about the effects
of the use of anabolic steroids, the Superintendent. of Public Instruction shall develop a
steroid education package consisting of teacher lesson plans, student pamphlets, parent
pamphlets, and videotapes to be distributed directly to school districts."). To educate the
adult population to the extent of making the intoxicating effects of anabolic steroids reason-
ably foreseeable, a legislature could mandate that signs telling of the potential psychological
effects be posted in all facilities that steroid abusers would be likely to frequent, i.e. gyms,
health clubs, locker rooms, etc. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.97 (West Supp. 1988) (requiring
all athletic facilities to post signs warning of the illegality of aiding or abetting unlawful
sale, use, or exchange of steroids). With Congress' awareness recently piqued, a Congres-
sional mandate funding the education program and mandating the athletic facility notice
might be feasible. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. No. 100-690, § 2402, 102 Stat.
4230 (instructing the Comptroller General to conduct a study on the extent of steroid use
among high school students, and other adults).
252. An education program also could serve as a method of "general" deterrence. See
A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 323 (2d ed. 1979) (explaining that general deterrence is the
theory that "the punishment imposed on a specific offender serves notice to potential male-
factors that they will suffer a similar fate."). The number of users could be reduced vastly
by the inclusion of a poignant warning in the education programs: "Warning: Use anabolic
steroids and you could become grossly intoxicated, commit a crime, and wind up spending
the rest of your life in prison." Such a consideration would affect drastically the cost/benefit
analysis the potential user would perform. Some might have offered the theory of general
deterrence as a viable purpose for punishing even the unwary steroid-induced psychotic.
However, even putting the constitutionality of such punishment aside, it still would be inef-
fective unless people were educated about this threat of punishment.
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made clear that the involuntary intoxication defense is not an eas-
ily wielded tool. So far, this Article only has determined that the
first two requirements necessary to such a defense can be met: that
the psychosis is intoxication and that this intoxication could be
created involuntarily. The third element is critical and quite possi-
bly insurmountable: the involuntary intoxication must produce a
state of mind that is the equivalent of legal insanity. 5 3 In effect,
the defendant's intoxication must be of such a degree that if his
incapacity was the result. of a mental disease or defect, instead of
an excessive dose of the intoxicant, he would be legally insane.254
As noted, Florida recognizes the M'Naghten rule as the legal
standard of insanity. 5 Thus, an accused claiming involuntary in-
toxication must satisfy M'Naghten by establishing that the intoxi-
cant rendered him incapable of knowing the nature and the conse-
quences of his actions, or, alternatively, incapable of knowing his
actions were wrong.256 This is indeed a formidable, if not impossi-
253. Section 2.08(4) of the Model Penal Code provides that, as a prerequisite to estab-
lish an involuntary intoxication defense, the defendant must establish that the intoxication
so affected his mental status that he is left in a condition satisfying the requirements of the
jurisdiction's definition of legal insanity. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (1985) ("Intoxication
which is [involuntary] . . . is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the
actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminal-
ity [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."). Cf. MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 4.01 (1985) (noting that the Code would consider a defendant insane "if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law."). Section 2.08(4) articulates the law which is regnant in the
United States. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 471, 238 N.W.2d
851, 857 (1976) (holding that the defense of involuntary intoxication is "available only when
the defendant is legally insane at the time of the alleged criminal offense."); Torres v. State,
585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that the test used for insanity is simi-
larly applicable to involuntary intoxication). Section 2.08(4) also implicitly provides that
involuntary intoxication, like voluntary intoxication, would be a defense if it negates a re-
quired mental state. S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATIuALs 963 (5th ed. 1989). However, were this the case, evidence of involuntary
intoxication only would be able to mitigate, not completely exculpate, for the same reasons
evidence of voluntary intoxication is so limited. See supra note 167. See also P. Low, supra
note 156, at 207 ("The involuntary intoxication in effect substitutes for the 'mental disease
or defect' in the formulation of the insanity defense, and the rest of the insanity defense
then governs.").
254. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment at 363 (1985) ("[Intoxication that is not
self-induced] excuses only if the resulting incapacitation is as extreme as that which would
establish irresponsibility had it resulted from mental disease.").
255. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 120, §4.2(a), at 312 ("The M'Naghten test has become the predominant test in
the United States.").
256. Cf. City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. 1976).
The Altimus court stated the parameters of the defense as follows:
Thus, a defense of involuntary intoxication should be allowed only in cases
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ble, task as the restrictive M'Naghten standard impedes the invol-
untarily intoxicated offender in his effort to establish the defense.
Despite heavy criticism, 7 M'Naghten's grip on the law of insanity
seems to be tightening.15 Consequently, it is likely that an accused
attempting to utilize the defense of involuntary intoxication will
continue to be hindered by the age-old chains of the M'Naghten
rule. 59
Moreover, jurors have a natural aversion to completely excul-
pating someone who has committed a violent crime. o It is quite
possible that they would reject an involuntary intoxication defense
even if the evidence clearly showed an involuntarily intoxicated de-
fendant whose state of mind satisfied M'Naghten. Nonetheless, if
the defendant can prove to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that
his involuntary intoxication left him in a condition which would be
legal insanity were it not the product of an intoxicant, the three
elements of the involuntary intoxication defense will have been
where the defendant at the time of committing the alleged criminal act was la-
boring under such a defect of reason because of a mental deficiency caused by
involuntary intoxication as not to know the nature of his act, or that it was
wrong.
Id. at 858.
257. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 120, § 4.2(c), at 317-19; A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 189, at 46-47. The cognitive approach of M'Naghten is all or nothing. See R.
GERBER, supra note 118, at 32 ("The test calls for total impairment: the accused must not
know at all."). It is claimed that such an approach-by failing to recognize that insanity is a
matter of degree, of gray areas rather than black on white-has limited substantially the
opportunities for its successful use. Id. at 32. Alternatively, the inability to know right from
wrong must be complete, another unrealistic requirement that has restricted the use of the
defense. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility Of The Mentally III, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59, 61
(1961) (claiming that "just about every defendant, no matter how mentally ill, no matter
how far advanced his psychosis, knows the difference between right and wrong in the literal
sense of the phrase .... ").
258. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.2(c), at 317 n.70 (noting that
Congress has adopted a M'Naghten style insanity test for use in the federal courts and that
recent law reform proposals, like M'Naghten, are stated solely in cognitive terms.).
259. Although it is difficult to meet the restrictive M'Naghten test, it is the authors'
position that a steroid-induced psychosis may debilitate an individual to the point that he is
unable to know the nature and the consequences of his acts, or that his acts are wrong.
Consequently, a steroid-induced psychosis may render an individual legally insane. For an
argument that an individual suffering from a steroid-induced psychosis may be insane as the
law defines the condition, see Testimony of David L. Katz, M.D., State v. Horace Williams,
No. 86-9257 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 10, 1988).
260. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 189, at 5, 24, 42, 63. Further, it must be noted that
complete exoneration is an even more unattractive option to a jury because, unlike an indi-
vidual insane as a result of a mental disease or defect, a steroid-induced psychotic would not
be likely to spend a great deal of time, if any, in a hospital. See, e.g., Order Pursuant to MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-117 at 4, -State v. Michael David Williams, supra note 10
(Williams, afflicted with a steroid-induced psychosis, was ordered discharged 22 days after
the court found him guilty but not criminally responsible.).
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met and the accused shall be exculpated.2
3. Procedure
Finally, prosecutors and defense counsel should be aware of
the procedure for utilizing the defense of involuntary intoxication.
There is no special plea which raises the defense."' 2 The defendant
simply enters a plea of not guilty.2 63 However, involuntary intoxi-
cation is an affirmative defense. " Consequently, the defendant
has not only the burden of going forward with evidence of intoxica-
tion but also the ultimate burden of persuasion. 65 Through the
testimony of experts the defense will have to prove that the result-
ing psychosis was indeed intoxication,66 that the intoxication was
involuntary, 67 and that the defendant was legally insane at the
time he committed the criminal act.
268
IV. CONCLUSION
An attorney representing a steroid user charged with a crime
must consider implementing evidence of a steroid-induced psycho-
261. Further, if research advances to a point where it is much clearer that a steroid-
induced psychotic's state of mind is such that he is unable to know the nature or conse-
quences of his act or that he is unable to know right from wrong, then the likelihood of
satisfying M'Naghten may be increased. Today, the research addressing the psychiatric ef-
fects of anabolic steroid use is still at a very young stage. See Deposition of Dr. David L.
Katz, M.D., supra note 205, at 57-58.
262. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120, § 4.10(i), at 398. See also AMI Crimi-
nal 4005 (1982) (Michie) (Prepared by the Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions,
Wayne Matthews, Chairman) (model jury instruction that might be requested when an ac-
cused offers involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense).
263. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, § 4.10(i), at 398.
264. Id. § 4.10(i), at 398.
265. See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 472, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858
(1976) (en banc). Cf. supra note 175 (discussing the constitutional limitations upon the allo-
cation of the burden of proof in a case where intoxication is offered as a defense). The
defendant attempting to use voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent has the burden
of production, but not the burden of persuasion. This is because the lack of specific intent is
not being offered as an affirmative defense, but rather as evidence negating an element that
the prosecution has to prove. In contrast, the claim of involuntary intoxication is an affirma-
tive defense.
266. Annotation, supra note 178, at 204.
267. Id. See also Grayson v. State, 687 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("Thus,
in order to invoke the defense of involuntary intoxication, a defendant must produce suffi-
cient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of defendant's intoxica-
tion."). Testimony will have to establish not only the absence of actual knowledge, but also
the fact that the defendant "ought not have known."
268. It should be noted that in many of the cases dealing with involuntary intoxica-
tion, involuntariness was established but the defense failed to show that the intoxication
deprived the accused of the necessary mental capacity. Annotation, supra note 178, at 204.
[Vol. 7:1
62
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/2
1989] STEROID-INDUCED PSYCHOSIS 63
sis to eliminate or, alternatively, limit the accused's criminal re-
sponsibility. However, due to the inescapable reality that any re-
sultant psychotic state is merely a by-product of drug use, reliance
on the standard insanity defense is misplaced. Instead, a steroid-
induced psychosis-which, as defined, falls within the generous
ambit of the Model Penal Code's definition of intoxication-is
more appropriately an occasion for a voluntary or an involuntary
intoxication defense. Even so, attorneys attempting to advance ei-
ther theory of intoxication should remember that pragmatic barri-
ers abound. Still, creative counsel, if armed with a case which is
factually appropriate, may find the defense to be a legitimate op-
tion in attempting to exculpate a client. In sum, the authors im-
plore defense counsel, prosecutors, and the bench to apprise them-
selves of the issues that may arise if a steroid user is charged with
a crime.
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